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INTRODUCTION
In May 2000, the governor of Maine, in an attempt to address the
problem of skyrocketing prescription drug prices in that state, signed
into law an Act to Establish Fairer Pricing for Prescription Drugs'
(hereinafter "the Act"). The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufac-
turers of America ("PhRMA") challenged this law, designed to coerce
drug manufacturers into charging lower prices to Maine's uninsured
residents, as being in violation of both the dormant Commerce
Clause and the Supremacy Clause3 of the United States Constitution.4
The Federal District Court of Maine preliminarily sided with PhRMA,
enjoining enforcement of specified parts of the law pending adjudi-
cation on the merits.5 In granting the injunction, the district court
found the likelihood of PhRMA's success on the merits to be "over-
whelming.
6
On appeal, a three judge panel on the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit found there to be no constitutional violation at all and
overturned the injunction in its entirety.7 Since then, the First Circuit
has refused PhRMA's request for a full court review, and the organi-
zation has taken its challenge to the Supreme Court.8 As of the time
• J.D. Candidate, 2002, University of Pennsylvania; B.S., 1990, Pennsylvania State University.
2000 Me. Legis. Serv. 786 (West).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
4 See Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction with Incorporated Memorandum of Law,
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv. (D. Me. Oct. 26,
2000) (No. 00-157-B-H).
5 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., No. 00-157-B-
H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *25 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000) (order granting preliminary in-
junction). The relevant sections of the statute and the initially enjoined portions are discussed
in Part II, infra.
6Id.
7 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 85 (1st Cir. 2001).
8 See, e.g., Drug Programs Success Depends on Participation: Fairer Prescription Prices Are Now
Within Reach, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 18, 2001, at 6A (claiming that the Court's refusal
to visit the matter is "another sign that the lav rests on solid constitutional ground").
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of this writing, the Court has not yet decided whether it will hear the
9case.
Against this backdrop, this Comment will assess the constitutional-
ity of the Act, principally under the dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine. I will also more briefly analyze the law under the Supremacy
Clause.
My legal conclusion is that the challenged portions of the Act are
unconstitutional under both of these constitutional provisions, as the
district court found. In making this assessment, however, this Com-
ment will argue that the actual conclusion should be somewhat dif-
ferent from that drawn by the district court, although not for the rea-
sons given by the First Circuit when it vacated the district court's
injunction.
My principal argument is that the law should be found constitu-
tional under the dormant Commerce Clause through a revision of
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. While a portion of the law also
violates the Supremacy Clause, other challenged portions do not and
only have dormant Commerce Clause implications. Therefore,
should this case reach the Supreme Court, the Court should take this
opportunity to reassess dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and find
this law within the State of Maine's legitimate police power to the ex-
tent it is not preempted."
I will start with the generally accepted idea that the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine was developed to prevent states from en-
gaging in economic protectionism vis-4-vis other states." I will then
argue that in past decisions, the Court has framed the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine to cast too wide a net, by delivering opin-
ions whose language is unnecessarily broad for the cases at issue, thus
laying the groundwork for invalidation of a non-protectionist state
law, such as the Act.
I will also argue that the possible discriminatory effect on citizens
of other states should not be a basis for invalidation of a state law that
has no protectionist motive. I will then bolster these assertions with
the view that judicial invalidation of non-protectionist state laws that
serve important social ends, such as the Act, would be particularly
harmful because (1) states do not have the political voice to make
sure that such invalidation is reversed when called for; and (2) invali-
dation of such laws would rob the states of their role as social policy
innovators, a role that is gaining increasing importance in the na-
tional effort to fashion a viable solution to the problem of access to
affordable prescription drugs.
9 See Statement by Marjorie Powell, Assistant General Counsel of PhRMA, (July 31, 2001),
http://iv.phrma.org/press/nevsreleases//2001-07-31.247.phtml (explaining that the or-
ganization has filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court).
10 See discussion infra Part HI.A.
1 See discussion infra Part MI.B.
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I. THE ACT
The Act directs the Commissioner of the Maine Department of
Health Services to negotiate lower drug prices on behalf of its eligible
residents by seeking rebates from participating pharmaceutical
manufacturers. 2 This is what is known as the Maine Rx Program.3 If
manufacturers balk at giving the rebates, the law directs the Commis-
sioner (1) to require "prior authorization" under Maine's Medicaid
program for all drugs sold by the recalcitrant manufacturer to Maine
under its Medicaid program, and (2) to make public the names of
these uncooperative parties. 1 Prior authorization essentially means
that a doctor may not prescribe the medication at issue without first
getting it approved by the state.'5 Under the Medicaid law, Maine has
the authority to require such prior authorization for the use of any
prescription drug in its Medicaid program. 16
The Act also prohibits "illegal profiteering" 7 and provides that
such illegal profiteering is also an "unfair trade practice" as defined
by the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act.' The law authorizes the
state to punish such illegal profiteering through court action and civil
penalties. 19
12 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(4) (West 2000). The law directs the Commissioner
to negotiate "an initial rebate amount equal to or greater than the rebate calculated under the
Medicaid program...." Id. at § 2681(4)(B). The rebate calculated under the Medicaid pro-
gram is set by federal law. See 42 U.S.CA. § 1396r-8 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) (requiring drug
manufacturers who sell drugs to state Medicaid programs to enter into rebate agreements for
specified discounts). The state would then pass that rebate on to pharmacies, which in turn
would pass it on the Maine Rx participants in the form of a discount. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 2681 (1) (West 2000).
Is ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681 (West 2000).
14 See i& at § 2681 (7).
15 See42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396r-8(d) (1) (A), 1396r-8(d) (5) (West 1992 & Supp. 2001).
16 See id. (authorizing a state to require approval of a drug before its dispensing as a condi-
tion of coverage or payment for a covered drug).'7
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2697 (West 2000). Illegal profiteering includes exacting
unconscionable prices, discrimination in the sale of prescription drugs, and limiting or restrict-
ing sales in retaliation for enforcement of this law. See id, at § 2697(2).
8 Id. at § 2697(5). Such an unfair trade practice is prohibited by the Maine Unfair Trade
Practices Act. See id.
19 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2697(3), (4) (West 2000).
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Finally, the Act allows for the imposition of price controls in three
years if prices are not reduced sufficiently by enforcement of the
aforementioned provisions.2 0 The district court preliminarily en-
joined enforcement of the prior authorization portion of the rebate
program in its entirety and the illegal profiteering portion as it ap-
plies to transactions occurring outside the state of Maine.2
II. THE AcT's CONSTrrUTIONALIY UNDER THE SUPREMACY
CLAUSE AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSES
Under current Supremacy Clause and dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine, the initially enjoined provisions of the Act do not pass con-
stitutional muster. In this section, I will establish this under each
constitutional provision. I will concentrate the bulk of my analysis on
the dormant Commerce Clause.
A. The Act Is Preempted by the Supremacy Clause
The Act's requirement22 that drugs manufactured by "nonpartici-
pating manufacturers"2 be subject to prior authorization under the
state's Medicaid program is preempted under the Supremacy Clause24
by federal Medicaid law. Preemption of a state or local law under the
Supremacy Clause occurs in three situations: (1) when federal law
expressly preempts it;2 (2) where the scheme of federal regulation is
0 SeeME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2693 (West 2000).
21 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., No. 00-157-B-
H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *25. The prior authorization provision was found to poten-
tially violate the Supremacy Clause with respect to all transactions and the Commerce Clause
with respect to out-of-state transactions, and the illegal profiteering provisions were found to
most likely violate the Commerce Clause with respect to out-of-state transactions.
22 Maine has attempted to characterize the prior authorization provision as a recommenda-
tion and not a requirement. It has proposed rules for implementation of the Maine Rx Pro-
gram that direct the Department of Health Services to recommend prior authorization of non-
participating companies' drugs to the Medicaid Drug Utilization Committee. See Defendants'
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Pharm. Re-
search & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv. (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000) (No. 00-
157-B-H).
However, the statute says the Department shall impose the prior authorization require-
ment. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(7) (West 2000). This is important because the
statute's requirement that prior authorization be imposed is automatically triggered when a
drug manuflacturer does not participate in the rebate program, without regard to whether or
not the patient needs the particular drug. This is what PhRMA argues contravenes the purpose
of the statute. See Plaintiff's Motion at 18, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. (No. 00-157-B-H).
Thus, Maine's attempt to characterize this requirement as a mere recommendation is an at-
tempt to get around this flaw.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681 (7) (West 2000).
24 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (citations
omitted) (holding that the Court "will find preemption ... where '[the challenged state law]
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress'").
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sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that
"Congress left no room" for supplementary state or local regulation;26
and (3) where the state or local law conflicts with the federal law.
27
PhRMA has argued that the prior authorization provision is in
conflict with federal Medicaid law.28 Its principle contention is that
the Act's use of the prior authorization provision of the Medicaid
statute contravenes the Medicaid law's purpose of providing access to
medical care for poor people by impeding dispensation of prescrip-
tion drugs to Medicaid beneficiaries in order to effectuate a non-
Medicaid program.29
The First Circuit was not persuaded by this argument, finding no
conflict because (1) the Act, like Medicaid, seeks to provide medical
care for the poor; (2) the Medicaid statute explicitly permits prior
authorization; (3) the Act only imposes prior authorization as permit-
ted by the Medicaid law; and (4) PhRMA did not present sufficient
proof that the prior authorization provision would work to the detri-
ment of Medicaid recipients.3
0
This reasoning can be contested on several grounds, however.
Conflict preemption generally occurs when the state or local law is
inconsistent with congressional objectives for the federal law.3' In this
case, the congressional objective for the Medicaid statute is to enable
states to provide necessary medical care to poor people in accordance• • • - *32
with each participating state's medical assistance plan. Specifically,
the congressional purpose for allowing states to require prior
authorization under their Medicaid programs is to allow states to pre-
vent unnecessary utilization of certain drugs and to assure that Medi-
caid payments for prescription drugs are "consistent with efficiency,
economy and quality of care. 
33
26 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (citations omitted).
27 See, e.g., Crosby, 530 U.S. at 363 (holding that the Court "will find preemption where it is
imp ossible for a private party to comply with both State and federal law").
See Plaintiffs Motion at 16-17, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. (No. 00-157-B-H) ("Requir-
ing prior authorization under the Medicaid program and restricting Medicaid patients' access
to drugs for this purpose-to penalize nonparticipation in an unrelated state program that
benefits a different, non-Medicaid population-is inconsistent with, and thus preempted by,
federal Medicaid law."). The district court agreed with this argument. See Pharm. Research &
Mfrs. of Am., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *20. However, the First Circuit found no conflict
between the Act and the Medicaid statute's structure and purpose.
See Plaintiffs Motion at 16-17, Pharm. Research &Mfrs. of Am. (No. 00-157-B-H).
30 See Pharm. Researchers & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 75-78 (1st Cir. 2001).
31 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372-73 (articulating this principle by saying that a state law is pre-
empted when it works as an obstacle to the execution of Congress' objectives).
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (West 1992). Such medical assistance includes prescription drugs.
See 42 C.F.R. § 456.703 (Government Printing Office 2000) (discussing the drug use review pro-
gram for the Health Care Financing Administration). See also Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 156
(1986) (noting that Medicaid provides "medical assistance to persons whose income and re-
sources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary care and services").
33 H. REP. No. 101-881, at98 (1990).
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It is inconsistent with these purposes to use the prior authoriza-
tion provision to force drug manufacturers to participate in a sepa-
rate state program. Indeed, it effectively allows Maine to unilaterally
alter the effect of the federal statute. Even if the Maine Rx Program
has the same general objective as the Medicaid statute,M the Medicaid
law sets specific parameters to govern specific situations. Once Maine
acts to alter those parameters, it has acted in conflict with the con-
gressional purpose to give effect to the legislative provisions as they
are set out in the federal statute. Thus, the prior authorization provi-
sion conflicts with the purpose of the Medicaid law itself."5 This must
be true even if Congress, in enacting the law, did not think of every
possible use that the state could make of that law; 36 the alternative
would be that Congress would never be able to predict with any cer-
tainty the effect of its laws.37 Thus, the fact that the prior authoriza-
tion provision is not on a collision course with congressional objec-
tives for Medicaid does not obviate its inconsistency with the
Medicaid law.
While court decisions in the area of preemption under the Medi-
caid law are limited in scope,m they support this analysis.39 Although
prior authorization was not the subject of these cases, the topics that
were addressed evidenced an agreement among the courts that state
regulation under the Medicaid law must be consistent with Medicaid
objectives. 0 And, as the district court pointed out, forcing the par-
As noted, this general objective is to provide necessary medical care-in this case, pre-
scrigtion drugs--to poor people.
See, &g., Seittelman v. Sabol, 697 N.E.2d 154, 158 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that because the
state requirement limited Medicaid reimbursement further than the federal Medicaid statute,
the state requirement undermined the purposes of the federal law, and was therefore invalid).
As the district court in Maine noted, "[i]t may never have occurred to Congress that the
Medicaid program could be hijacked to provide leverage for other purposes." Pharm. Research
&Mfr. of Am., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *20 n.12.
Implict in this statement is the assumption that Congress cannot ex ante think of every use
the states might make of the Medicaid law.
There are only two Supreme Court cases on the issue, both addressing the issue of state
funding of abortion. See infra note 39.
59 See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (holding that state law that denied payment for non-
therapeutic abortions was not preempted as it did not contravene federal purpose to provide
medically necessary services); Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Serv., 516 U.S. 474
(1996) (holding that injunction of state constitutional provision denying payment under state
programs for any abortions other than those necessary to save the mother's life was improperly
broad as it may apply to programs that are entirely state funded, and as it may apply to future
periods when Congress may not provide funding for abortions other than those necessary to
save the mother's life).
Examples of areas that have been addressed are state resource requirements for Medicaid
eligibility and state laws restricting funding for non-therapeutic abortions under Medicaid. See,
e.g., Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2000); Mathews v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 476
N.E.2d 213 (Mass. 1985); Whitfield v. King, 364 F. Supp. 1296 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (addressing re-
source requirements). See also Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Engler, 860 F. Supp. 406 (W.D.
Mich. 1994); Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1980) (addressing abortion funding). In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue of abortion funding -under Medicaid and
has not disagreed with this analysis. See supra note 39.
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ticipation of drug manufacturers in the Maine Rx Program is not a
Medicaid objective.4'
An additional factor that weighs in favor of finding that the prior
authorization provision is preempted is the fact that the Medicaid
statute provides specifically for permissive alterations of the general
Medicaid program through the grant of waivers. 2 These waivers al-
low states to be exempted from certain Medicaid requirements or to
alter the Medicaid structure in certain ways upon application to and
permission from the federal government.43 The purpose of these
waivers is to give a state the opportunity to tailor its Medicaid pro-
gram to suit local needs more effectively, or to allow it to experiment
44with new healthcare programs. The fact that a state must get spe-
cific permission to waive the application of non-discretionary provi-
sions of the Medicaid law is strong support for the argument that
states ma y not alter these provisions independently through a sepa-
rate law4
Finally, while the agency that administers the federal Medicaid
program, the Health Care Financing Administration, has not issued
regulations regarding the prior authorization provision of the Medi-
caid program, it has issued proposed regulations indicating that the
use of this provision to limit coverage to specified prescription drugs
violates the Medicaid statute."
What the foregoing argument shows is that under the current
regulatory framework, Maine may not use the federal Medicaid law to
41 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *19 (observing that
Maine can point to no Medicaid purpose for the prior authorization requirement).
42 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(b)I (West 1992) (authorizing a variety of waivers). See also 42
U.S.C.A. § 1315(a) (West 1992) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
waive any part of the Medicaid law for state demonstration projects); Fernando R. LaGuarda,
Note, Federalism Myth: States As Laboratories of Health Care Reform, 82 GEO. LJ. 159, 179 n.113
(1993) (discussing the Section 1315(a) waiver).
43 See LaGuarda, supra note 42, at 178-79.
44 See id. at 178 (noting that such waivers allow states to try different approaches to finance
and delivery of healthcare and to meet special local needs).
45 States have some discretion over what they cover under the Medicaid statute. For exam-
ple, they are not required to provide nursing facilities or home health services for those who are
not categorically needy. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 870 (3d ed. 1997).
46 It is important to note here that the Act, designed to be a program separate from Medi-
caid, was not the subject of a Medicaid waiver application. However, in the wake of the pre-
liminary injunction of enforcement of the Act, Maine did apply for and receive a waiver from
the Health Care Financing Administration allowing it to extend the Medicaid prescription drug
discount to certain Maine residents who are not eligible for Medicaid. This waiver was modeled
after the one recently granted to Vermont. See Press Release, Maine Department of Human
Services, Maine Receives Federal Prescription Drug Waiver (Jan. 19, 2001), available at
http://janus.state.me.us/dhs/pressdd.htm. PhRMA has challenged the legality of the Vermont
waiver. See discussion infra note 254.
47 See Pharm. Research &Mfrs. ofAm., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *20 n.12.
48 See Medicaid Program; Payment for Covered Outpatient Drugs Under Drug Rebate
Agreements with Manufacturers, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,454 (Sept. 19, 1995) (stating the administra-
tion's belief that states should be prevented from "using a prior authorization program as a
proxy for a closed formulary" allowing for coverage of only certain specified drugs).
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induce manufacturer participation in the Maine Rx Program without
violating the Supremacy Clause. But the anti-profiteering provisions
of the Act (as well as the price control provisions which have not as
yet been the subject of litigation) are not preempted. Therefore, the
fact that the prior authorization provision is preempted does not end
the analysis, and the dormant Commerce Clause must also be consid-
ered .
B. The Act Is Prohibited Under Current Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine
Before beginning my analysis of the Act under the dormant
Commerce Clause, I Will first provide a short discussion of the back-
ground and purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause. This discus-
sion will illustrate that enjoining the Act would not farther the pur-
poses that the dormant Commerce Clause is meant to serve.
1. History and Background
The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have
the power "[t] o regulate commerce.., among the several States...
,"" This language speaks directly to the powers of Congress and no-
where implies any limitations on the power of the states to regulate
commerce. However, the Supreme Court has inferred two such limi-
tations. One is that in an area that Congress has explicitly regulated
pursuant to its commerce power, the Supremacy Clause preempts any
state regulation. 51 This limitation has direct constitutional authority 
2
and is relatively uncontroversial.
The other limitation is that even in areas of interstate commerce
that Congress has not expressly regulated, states may not impose laws
that facially discriminate against"' interstate commerce, nor may they
impose laws that excessively burden54 interstate commerce even if
4 For the sake of completeness, the prior authorization provision will be examined under
the dormant Commerce Clause, even though, asjust discussed, it is unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
51 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). See also infra Part hI.A (discuss-
ing how Maine's prior authorization requirement fails under this portion of the Constitution).
2 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 1.
53 See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994) ("The paradigmatic
example of a law discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective tariff or customs
duty, which taxes goods imported from other States, but does not tax similar products pro-
duced in State."). Another name for discrimination against interstate commerce is economic
protectionism. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("where simple
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has
been erected"). As both names imply, state laws of this type have the purpose of discriminating,
or protecting a particular state's economy vis-A-vis the economies of other states. As stated une-
quivocally in Philadelphia v. NewJersey, supra, such laws will be automatically invalidated.
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (setting forth what is now known
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they do not facially discriminate. These two prohibitions form the
foundation of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The principal
reason given for the necessity of the inferred limitation on state
power is to prevent the "economic Balkanization"55 that would result
from individual states enacting legislation for the purpose of protect-
ing their own interests at the expense of out-of-state interests. 6 This
state self-interest has been termed a "protectionist purpose" by consti-
tutional scholar Donald Regan."
At this juncture it is appropriate to define exactly what is meant by
protectionist purpose. In this Comment, it has a much narrower
meaning than a state simply enacting legislation that it intends to
benefit its residents and impose a cost on out-of-state actors. As Re-
gan describes it, "the immediate intended means to improvement of
local well-being is the transfer of certain profitable activities from for-
eign to local hands," analogous to a tariff, embargo or quota.5s In
other words, the state must intend to take away from out-of-state ac-
tors in order to give to its local residents. 59 This definition does not
as the Pike balancing test: a legitimate law that regulates evenhandedly will be upheld unless
the burden on interstate commerce is "clearly excessive" in relation to local benefits). This task
of judicial balancing has generated criticism, notably from one of the Court's own members,
Justice Antonin Scalia. See discussion infra Part V.
5 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (discussing economic Balkanization in
reference to the colonies).
See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 578 (1997)
("By encouraging economic isolationism, prohibitions on out-of-state access to in-state re-
sources serve the very evil that the dormant Commerce Clause was designed to prevent.");
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) ("We are reminded in the opinion below
that a chief occasion of the commerce clauses was 'the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the
States, taking form in customs barriers and other economic retaliation.'") (internal citations
omitted).
57 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (1986). I rely extensively on Regan's article in my
discussion throughout this Comment. His thesis is that when the Court decides dormant
Commerce Clause cases, while it claims to strike down laws that unduly burden interstate com-
merce using a balancing test, in reality it does not, and should not, balance burdens. Instead,
Regan says, the Court only invalidates state laws that have a protectionist purpose. His argu-
ment is that this is all the Court does and should do. See id. at 1092. In this Comment I extend
this reasoning to state laws with an extraterritorial reach. That is, the fact that a state law has an
extraterritorial reach should not be sufficient to invalidate it without a protectionist purpose.
1 See id. at 1113; see also id. at 1095.
59 Another way that I have described this concept elsewhere in this Comment is as a state's
purpose to improve the economic position of its residents vis-A-vis the residents of other states.
I have also described the parties being benefited or harmed by a protectionist law inter-
changeably as residents, citizens, or economic actors. These parties could be individuals or en-
tities in business for economic gain. See Regan, supra note 57, at 1095 (using the catchall term
of economic actors to describe producers, workers, consumers, distributors, etc.). I have only
incorporated part of Regan's definition of protectionist purpose, which is even narrower than
what I have described. He further says that the state's purpose must be to advantage local ac-
tors at the expense of foreign actors who perform the same economic function in the foreign
economy. Another example would be benefiting local producers at the expense of out-of-state
producers. See id. at 1095. I will not go this far as it appears such a definition might not include
as protectionist the laws at issue in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority,
476 U.S. 573 (1986) and Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989), both discussed in Part
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include mere incidental harm to out-of-state interests in the process
of conferring an independent local benefit.6°
The other reason often cited for the necessity of the dormant
Commerce Clause limitation on state power is the need to maintain
the unimpeded flow of national commerce. Thus, a state law that
unduly burdens this flow also cannot stand.6' A balancing test is used
to determine whether a state law imposes an undue burden on na-
tional commerce. 2 It is not clear that this second reason is fully dis-
tinguishable from the first one. However, Donald Regan has argued
that in the movement-of-goods cases, even laws purportedly struck
down under the "burden to interstate commerce" rubric were actu-
ally eliminated because of their protectionist purpose.63 He supports
this conclusion with an extensive analysis of Supreme Court dormant
Commerce Clause cases, where state laws that had a protectionist
purpose were struck down for being too burdensome to interstate
commerce." Moreover, the goal of maintaining the unimpeded flow
of interstate commerce is closely related to preventing economic pro-
tectionism by states.65 It appears that in most instances, the second
goal-that of maintaining the free flow of interstate commerce-is a
restatement of the first one-that of preventing economic protection-
ism.
There is another twist that must be considered in determining
whether a state law exceeds its constitutional limitations. It is the
idea the states do not have the right to directly regulate transactions
occurring outside their borders whether or not their purpose is to
discriminate against interstate commerce. This idea is often called
1V.A.., infra, which I argue are protectionist. These laws advantaged local consumers vis-a-vis
out-of-state consumers and, but also at the expense of, foreign distributors.
60 SeeRegan, supranote 57, at 1113.
61 See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitu-
tional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 570 (1987) (noting that this is one of the Su-
preme Court's two primary justifications for the dormant Commerce Clause). See also BeerInst.,
491 U.S. at 335-36 (noting the Constitution's special concern with the maintenance of a na-
tional economic union).
Q See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (introducing the modem balanc-
ing test).
See Regan, supra note 57, at 1108 (noting that the matter is not so straightforward for
other cases, such as those involving interstate transportation or state taxes, and limiting his ar-
gument to movement-of-goods cases involving the buying and selling of goods in interstate
commerce). I will likewise limit my analysis to movement-of-goods cases since the sale of phar-
maceuticals fits within that category.
See id- at 1209-33 (discussing the leading precedent for balancing burdens and benefits
under the dormant Commerce Clause, and showing that most of the state laws that were invali-
dated under a balancing test actually had a protectionist purpose).
See id. at 1128 (arguing that what he calls the "concept-of-union" objection to state regula-
tion rests on the idea that economic actors should not be shut out of a state's market by prefer-
ential trade regulations, but that such preferential laws do not include a state legislature's non-
discriminatory determination of what should and should not be sold in its market simply be-
cause that determination may exclude someone).
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extraterritorial regulation." Before the advent of the balancing test,
this analysis had historically been used when there was an empirical
showing that the burden on interstate commerce was too great.
However, this analysis was recently used in Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority to invalidate a New York law
that set price ceilings for liquor sold in-state based on the seller's low-
est price in other states. The Court held that a state law that "directly
regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce" will generally
be struck down "without further inquir. 6 9 Based on the Court's lan-
guage in Brown-Forman and its progeny, there is no need to decide if
such a law unduly burdens interstate commerce; such a law, like a law
with a protectionist purpose, is subject to a "virtually per se rule of in-
validity"7' under the dormant Commerce Clause.7 ' Finding that the
Act does directly regulate interstate commerce, it is this standard that
the district court in Maine relied on to grant the preliminary injunc-
tion in favor of PhRMA .
2. Analysis of the Act Under the Dormant Commerce Clause
In this section, I will apply the Brown-Forman analysis to the Act, as
the district court did, to show that it fails under current dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. In the next Part, I will show why an
analysis that invalidates a state law simply for reaching across state
lines is unnecessarily broad, given that the principal aim of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause is to prevent states from engaging in eco-
nomic protectionism.
66 See Baldwin v. GA.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (holding that states have no power
to project their legislation into other states by regulating the price to be paid for goods ac-
quired in other states).
67 See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 268 (13th ed.
1997) (discussing the application of the "direct"-"indirect" distinction as an empirical showing
of the burden on interstate commerce).
63 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
69 See id. at 579. The Court set forth this standard even though in this case there clearly was
a protectionist purpose- giving local consumers the advantage of the same or a lower price for
liquor as consumers in any other state, at the expense of out-of-state distributors.
See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (holding that a Connecticut statute requrng
sellers of beer to sell to Connecticut consumers at the lowest price that beer was sold to con-
sumers in bordering states violated the dormant Commerce Clause).
71 Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
72 Thus a law that regulates outside the state will be invalidated the same way a law that dis-
criminates against interstate commerce would. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Don-
aid Regan asserts that the Commerce Clause does not even apply to what he calls genuinely ex-
traterritorial state regulation, but rather that such regulation violates our federal structure in
general. See Regan, supra note 57, at 1280 (discussing a plurality (but not majority) endorse-
ment of the extraterritoriality theory in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality
opinion)). But what Regan is speaking of here is extraterritorial legislation that burdens other
states, not private parties. See id. at n.164. See discussion infra notes 129-31 and accompanying
text.
73 See Pharm. Research &Mfrs. of Am, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at **15-16.
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The district court in Maine enjoined specified portions of the
statute on the ground that after a full proceeding on the merits, these
portions would be held unconstitutional. 74 The provisions that the
court found problematic under the dormant Commerce Clause were
the illegal profiteering provision and the rebate program (the Maine
Rx Program) as enforced by the prior authorization provision.75 The
court enjoined both of these provisions because they effectively regu-
lated transactions conducted outside of the state of Maine.76 Since at
this stage the court had merely issued a preliminary injunction, it did
not reach the issue of price controls, which are only a backup provi-
sion of the Act.77 Presumably if price controls were enforced, they
would be problematic for the same reason.7s
On appeal, the First Circuit vacated the injunction with respect to
the prior authorization provision (Maine did not appeal the injunc-
tion of the anti-profiteering provisions) by finding that it does not
regulate extraterritorially. 79 Since the prior authorization provision
and the anti-profiteering provisions are discussed separately below, a
more detailed discussion of the First Circuit's holding is saved for the
section addressing the prior authorization provision. In that section,
I will argue that the First Circuit was only able to reach this conclu-
sion by disregarding recent Supreme Court precedent describing the
standard for impermissible extraterritorial regulation. This discus-
sion will show that this precedent unmistakably encompasses the
Act's prior authorization provision.
In contrast to the First Circuit's holding, the district court's con-
clusion is in hannony with current dormant Commerce Clause analy-
sis. The Court has stated as recently as 1989 that the "Commerce
Clause... precludes the application of a state statute to commerce
that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, ... [and] a
statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the
boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting
State's authority, and is invalid. ..."" The Court reiterated that the
state's motive in enacting legislation is irrelevant in this regard and
that what is critical is the statute's extraterritorial effect.8 '
74 See id. at *25.
75 See i&. at **5-7, **15-16.
76 See id. An explanation of how the Act regulates extraterritorially follows.
77 The price control provision of the Act is only to be resorted to if the other mechanisms,
i.e., the anti-profiteering provision and the rebate program, do not sufficiently lower drug
prices in the next three years. SeeME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2693 (West 2000).
The price control provision is what attracted the most media attention. However, it was
not specifically challenged, nor was it addressed by either the district or the appellate court,
most likely because the imposition of price controls is speculative at this point.
See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 81 (1st Cir. 2001).
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (internal citations omitted). In making this state-
ment, the Court cites Brown-Forman, Edgar v. MITE Corp. and G.A.F. Seelig. See discussion infra
Part VA.
81 See id (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
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a. The Extraterritorial Reach of the Anti-Profiteering Provisions Violates the
Dormant Commerce Clause
Application of the above principles to the anti-profiteering provi-
sion of the Act invalidates it without much analysis. The anti-
profiteering provision subjects drug manufacturers to ramifications
for transactions entered into entirely outside of Maine, because all of
the major drug manufacturers and most of their direct customers-
wholesalers and distributors-are located outside of Maine.s2 The pro-
vision indirectly punishes out-of-state manufacturers for charging
"excessive" prices to these out-of-state distributors and wholesalers.
Since this clearly constitutes regulation of an extraterritorial transac-
tion, the provision cannot be enforced with respect to out-of-state ac-
tors.s4
b. The Rebate Program Also Has an Impermissible Extraterritorial Effect
The rebate program is somewhat less straightforward. However, if
the prior authorization requirement is analyzed as a regulatory sanc-
tion as opposed to a market inducement,a' it fails under the same
analysis. The rebate program essentially requires"6 drug manufactur-
ers to provide the statutorily mandated discounts or be subject to the
prior authorization provision. The state has attempted to frame the
program as voluntary,"7 but in reality the state is subjecting a manu-
facturer to what is essentially a regulatory sanction. That this re-
quirement is really legal coercion and not a market inducement is
clarified by examining the state's participation argument.
The state argues that the rebate program is merely an exercise of
its market power as a volume purchaser of prescription drugs under
573 (1986)).
82 See Pharm. Research &Mfrs. of Am., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *13 (noting that there
are no drug manufacturers located in Maine).83 These wholesalers and distributors will then pass the excessive prices on to Maine phar-
macies and ultimately to Maine consumers.
84 Presumably, if title passes in Maine to any wholesaler or distributor located in Maine, this
provision could be enforced against the selling manufacturer. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of
Am., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *6 (noting that there is one distributor in Maine, so this
scenario is possible).
Maine has tried to characterize the rebate program as a market inducement in order to
bring the Act under the market participation exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.
The market participation exception is explained fully beginning in the next paragraph.
86 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(3) (West 2001). This provision says that drug
manufacturers who sell drugs to any state drug assistance programs (including Medicaid) shall
enter into a rebate agreement. See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(7) (West 2001). This
provision says the Department shall impose the prior authorization requirement on non-
participators. The two provisions combined can only be construed as a requirement.
See Defendants' Memorandum at 25, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. (No. 00-157-B-H) (ar-
guing that Maine is simply requesting rebates).
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its Medicaid program.Y The state claims that in giving the drug
manufacturers this choice between participating in the Maine Rx
Program and granting the rebates or being subject to the prior
authorization requirement under its Medicaid program, the prior
authorization requirement is just a bargaining chip that the state uses
to negotiate with them. 9 The Supreme Court has created an excep-
tion to the strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause when a state
participates in the market as an ordinary buyer or seller.9 The Court
reasons that when the state is acting as a market participant (i.e.,
buyer or seller), it is neither regulating nor legislating. Therefore,
the state should be free to do business with whomever it chooses like
any other participant in the market.91 In this case, however, the state
is not buying or selling anything. It is simply using the Medicaid
scheme to achieve a separate regulatory goal-reducing prescription
drug prices for its uninsured citizens.9 The Supreme Court has ex-
pressly held that a state law using the state's leverage in one market
where it does participate to achieve a separate regulatory purpose is
subject to the dormant Commerce Clause as a state regulation, and is
not market participation.3 As the district court in Maine pointed out,
the result might well be different if the state were actually buying the
prescription drugs in question.94 In this case, however, the State of
Maine is not in fact acting as a market "participant" but rather as a




See, e.g., White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 214 (1983) (holding
that city is a market participant and not subject to the Commerce Clause when it only gives city
funded work projects to work forces comprised of at least 50% city residents); Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (upholding state policy restricting sale of cement from a state-owned
plant to state residents); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808 (1976) (holding
that state acted as a market participant when it paid a bounty for destruction of abandoned cars
and required less paperwork of in-state processors (destroyers) than it did of out-of-state proces-
sors).
91 See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810 ("Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce
Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the mar-
ket and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.").
92 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(1) (West 2001) (laying out program goal of the
Maine Rx Program as that of making prescription drugs more affordable for qualified Maine
residents).
93 See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96-98 (1984) (holding that
Alaska's statute limiting buyers of its timber to those who agreed to process the purchased tim-
ber in Alaska to be subject to the dormant Commerce Clause).
See Pharm. Research &Mfrs. of Am, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *12 n.8. Donald Regan also
points out that when the state is acting as a market participant, it is spending money. See Regan,
supra note 57, at 1193. Maine is spending no money in the Maine Rx Program, it is simply re-
quiring drug manufacturers to charge a lower price to their Maine customers. The First Circuit
agreed with this analysis, noting that since Maine is not a market buyer of prescription drugs,
except as required by its Medicaid program, the state cannot be a market participant. See
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66,81 (1st Cir. 2001).
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The foregoing analysis illustrates that the prior authorization pro-
vision of the rebate program is not a market inducement, but is in
fact a regulatory sanction. Once this is determined, the provision
fails dormant Commerce Clause analysis for the same reason the anti-
profiteering provision does: the Act regulates extraterritorial eco-
nomic transactions by imposing either a rebate agreement or prior
authorization requirement on drugs that are part of an out-of-state
sale between out-of-state manufacturers who do not grant rebates,
and out-of-state wholesalers and distributors.95
The First Circuit rejected this approach, however, finding that the
prior authorization provision is simply not extraterritorial regulation.
The court focused on the statutory language calling for negotiated
rebate amounts under the rebate agreements rather than on the lan-
guage subjecting drug manufacturers to outright price controls or
mandating the tying of drug prices in Maine to drug prices in other
states, both features of state laws previously invalidated for regulating
extraterritorially. The court held that Maine is simply "negotiating"
rebates, and therefore was not "regulating" prices.9 The court dis-
counted the fact that a drug manufacturer's decision whether to en-
ter into a rebate agreement is essentially non-negotiable by virtue of
the prior authorization provision, disposing of this argument by call-
ing the rebate program "voluntary. "9 It then held that since the pur-
chase of a prescription drug triggering the rebate occurs in-state (at a
local pharmacy), and since the negotiation of the rebate amount or
the subjecting of the manufacturer's drugs to prior authorization oc-
curs in-state, the statute not only does not "regulate" transactions be-
tween manufacturers and wholesalers, it does not do so out-of-state.98
After determining that the Act does not regulate extraterritorially,
the First Circuit evaluated it under the Pike balancing test. The court
determined that the Act has only incidental effects on interstate
commerce and that the Act's benefits to Maine residents outweigh
any burden on interstate commerce.99
This decision puts form over substance, and fails to follow estab-
lished Supreme Court precedent dealing with extraterritorial regula-
tion. As noted previously, Supreme Court precedent is quite clear
95 An analysis of the extraterritorial nature of the anti-profiteering provision is discussed
above. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
96 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., 249 F.3d at 82. The previous cases referred to are Healy
v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (price tying); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (price tying); and Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511
(1935) (price controls).
97 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., 249 F.3d at 82.
98 See id.
See id. at 83-84 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). The Pike bal-
ancing test refers to the Supreme Court's construction of the balancing test, which says that a
legitimate law that regulates evenhandedly and has only incidental effects on interstate com-
merce will be upheld unless the burden on interstate commerce is "clearly excessive" in relation
to local benefits.
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that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits a state's regulation of
transactions occurring wholly outside its borders.100 Moreover, this
precedent establishes that the critical inquiry in determining a state
law's validity is whether it has the "practical effect" of regulating
commerce occurring outside the state's borders.10' Thus it does not
matter if the statute does not on its face regulate out-of-state transac-
tions. The First Circuit failed to follow this precedent by ignoring the
Act's purpose and practical effect of reaching out-of-state transactions
between drug manufacturers and distributors. No drug manufactur-
ers are located in Maine, and only one distributor resides there. The
Act's purpose and effect is to lower the revenues received by these
out-of-state manufacturers on drugs to be sold in Maine.°2 These
revenues are received from out-of-state distributors in sales transac-
tions occurring outside of Maine. No valid argument can be made
that the Act, in its intent or practical effect, does not reach these
transactions.
The court of appeals also put form over substance by characteriz-
ing the rebate program as voluntary. While the statute calls for nego-
iation of the actual rebate amount,03 the manufacturers' choice of
whether to either enter into a rebate agreement or allow their drugs
to be subject to prior authorization is essentially non-negotiable. 04
Moreover, the court made no mention of PhRMA's evidence that
prior authorization often has a substantial negative effect on market
share. That aside, this analysis fails to recognize that Maine did not
intend these agreements to be voluntary-in deciding to subject un-
cooperative manufacturers to the prior authorization requirement,
the state had obviously determined that a voluntary program would
not be sufficiently effective.
10 6
Since the Act regulates extraterritorially through the use of the
prior authorization provision, the First Circuit's use of the Pike bal-
ancing test is also inappropriate. As previously discussed, the Su-
preme Court seems to have closed the door on balancing for state
100 See Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 336.
101 See id. at 332. Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that dormant Commerce Clause
analysis requires a case-by-case analysis of the purposes and effects of the state law at issue, not
the formalistic approach employed by the First Circuit. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994).
102 See Pharm. Research &Mfrs. ofAm, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *15 (observing that the
practical effect of the Act is to limit the revenue an out-of-state manufacturer can obtain when it
sells drugs to out-of-state distributors that are destined for Maine).
103 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(4) (West 2001).
104 See supra note 22 (discussing the automatic consequence of the prior authorization re-
quirement if a manufacturer fails to enter into a rebate agreement with the state).
105 This is one of the factors the district court relied on to determine that the rebate program
was not voluntary. SeePharm. Research &Mfrs. of Am., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *22.
10 See id. (noting that it is common sense to conclude that the requirement was put in to give
the statute some "bite").
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laws that regulate extraterritorially. 0 7 Even if it had not done so di-
rectly, the current balancing test employed by the Court calls for the
state regulation to have only an "incidental" effect on interstate
commerce before balancing the benefits and burdens.' 8 This indi-
cates that the test applies where the challenged law only seeks to
regulate locally but has an incidental side effect on interstate com-
merce.09 This is not the case here, where the local law seeks to regu-
late extraterritorial transactions directly, notwithstanding the First
Circuit's assertion to the contrary. 0 Its statement that the Act's ef-
fects on interstate commerce are incidental was made without analy-
sis, and is belied by the Act's extraterritorial purpose and effect.
In summary, the relevant portions of the Act violate the dormant
Commerce Clause simply because they constitute extraterritorial
regulation. Having established this, I now turn to the central focus of
this Comment, that the Act should be upheld under the dormant
Commerce Clause, not (as the First Circuit did) by attempting to
change its character, but through re-evaluation of dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine.
III. THE ACT SHOULD BE FOUND CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
While the district court in Maine properly found a violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause under current doctrine, when evaluated
in light of the history and rationale behind the development of dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine, the Act should be upheld. This is
true for several reasons. First, and most important, the Act has no
unlawful protectionist purpose, against which the dormant Com-
merce Clause is meant to protect."' Therefore the doctrine that
107 See Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 336 (internal citations omitted) (holding that a state law that
regulates wholly outside the state's borders is invalid simply because such a law exceeds the en-
acting state's inherent authority). See also supra text accompanying notes 80-81 (quoting Healy
v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989)).
108 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (requiring state law to regulate evenhandedly and have only an
incidental effect on interstate commerce before the Court will balance its benefits against the
burden on interstate commerce).
109 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding a law
requiring milk sold locally to be in recyclable containers if the containers were non-returnable,
despite the incidental imposition on out-of-state sellers who sold milk within the state).
See Pharm. Research &Mfrs. of Am., 249 F.3d at 83. The Act is extraterritorial in its purpose
because it is designed to reach the prices charged by manufacturers, no matter where they con-
duct their sales. No doubt the Maine legislature knew that they would be conducting most of
these sales outside of Maine.
III For a full discussion of why the dormant Commerce Clause should only be used to pre-
vent implementation of state laws enacted with a protectionist purpose, see infra Part IVA. In
making this argument I essentially extend Donald Regan's theory that the Court does not and
should not balance to extraterritorial regulation. He argues that the Court, while employing a
balancing rubric, strikes down only protectionist state laws. See Regan, supra note 57, at 1092.
Similarly, as I will show, the Court also strikes down protectionist state laws while dubbing them
extraterritorial. To be sure, their reach is "extraterritorial," but that is not why they are invalid.
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would invalidate it is overly broad. Nor is a possible discriminatory
effect sufficient grounds for invalidation, since this should only be
relevant if there is an unlawful purpose.12 In a related vein, the law's
effect on private interests is not a valid reason in itself to strike down
the law, because this is not what the dormant Commerce Clause is in
place to prevent.13 Also, since states are often at a political disadvan-
tage in relation to private interests, it becomes especially important
for the Court to uphold state laws that do not offend dormant Com-
merce Clause principles."4  Furthermore, the instant issue is
healthcare, a traditional area of state responsibility."5 Related to this,
and what makes this entire issue novel, is that while healthcare has
traditionally been a state issue, healthcare reform is now on the na-
tional agenda. Moreover, the federal government, having been thus
far unable to come up with a viable reform strategy, is looking to
states to lead the way. 16 It therefore makes no sense to employ an
unnecessarily broad interpretation of dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine to curtail their efforts. Each of these reasons is addressed in
turn.
A. The Act Should Not Exceed the State's Commerce Power Because
Maine Has No Unlawful Protectionist Motive
17
Since Maine seeks no unlawful economic advantage for its resi-
dents through the passage of the Act, the law should be upheld un-
der the dormant Commerce Clause. The lack of any protectionist
purpose has not been disputed, and was acknowledged by the Maine
district court.". However, the court looked to the leading case of
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,"9 a case involving New York's attempt to
prohibit the sale of milk within its borders if the milk had been pur-
chased outside the state at a price below New York's statutorily im-
posed minimum. This effectively regulated the price of any milk
Thus, striking down the Act without finding a protectionist purpose, while consistent with the
Court's language, is generally not consistent with the modem Court's practice.
112 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
11 See id
114 See infra Part IV.C.
1 See infra Part IV.D.
116 See infra Part IV.C.
17 For purposes of this discussion, "protectionist purpose" should be given the precise mean-
ing defined earlier. This definition does not include cases where the harm to out-of-state inter-
ests is a known, but incidental effect of the benefit to in-state interests. It only includes in-
stances where the detriment to out-of-state interests is an intended means to achieve local well-
being. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
118 See Pharm. Research &Mfrs. ofAm, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *13 (acknowledging no
attempt by Maine to favor in-state business over out-of-state business). For the majority of this
discussion, I will apply the district court's analysis, which is more consistent with dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine than that of the First Circuit.
1 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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bought outside of New York if there was an intention to sell it to New
York consumers.
The district court found a parallel situation with the anti-
profiteering provision of the Act, because if a drug manufacturer en-
gages in the profiteering deemed illegal by the statute when it sells
drugs destined for Maine to a wholesaler or distributor located out-
side of Maine, the drug manufacturer will have violated the Act with-
out ever having transacted business in Maine. The court found this
to be no different than what the state of New York did in G.A.F.
Seelig 20 The court acknowledged, however, that there was no intent
to advantage Maine businesses over out-of-state businesses. 121 This
makes G.A.F. Seelig different from the instant case, because in G.A.F.
Seelig, the clear purpose of the statute was to give New York milk pro-
ducers an advantage over their out-of-state competitors. 22 However,
the court pointed to more recent decisions of the Supreme Court
that expressly state that states have no authority to regulate outside
their borders regardless of purpose.2 3 Specifically, the court quoted
language from two cases involving state regulation of alcoholic bever-
age prices that tied the prices that sellers could charge to prices
charged in other states. 2 4 In these cases, the Court extrapolates from
earlier decisions 12 to make the sweeping statement that it does not
matter what a state's motive is for the law at issue; any extraterritorial
regulation is automatically disallowed as beyond the states' constitu-
tional authority.
16
The problem with the Court's analysis is that a true application of
this principle would have an overinclusive result. Perhaps there is no
reason for concern, however, if the Court does not really apply its
12 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *14 (substituting pre-
scription drugs for milk and finding G.A.F. Seelig to apply). The court made this comparison
when analyzing the prior authorization provisions, but the opinion references this analysis
when discussing the illegal profiteering provisions. As discussed in Part III, the dormant Com-
merce Clause applies to both in exactly the same way.
1 See id. at *13. Nevertheless, applying Supreme Court precedent, the district court held
that since Maine has no power to regulate extraterritorially, it is irrelevant whether the Act ac-
tualy discriminates against interstate commerce. See id. at **15-16.
See G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. at 522 (noting that the purpose of the New York milk law was to
protect its farmers from interstate competition).
123 See supra text accompanying notes 80-81 (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324
(1989)).
124 See Pharm. Research &Mfs. of Am., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at **14-15 (quoting from
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) and Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986)).
These previous decisions are Edgar v. MITE Cop., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Raymond Motor
Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Philadelphia v. NewJers, 437 U.S. 617 (1978);
and Shaferv. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925). All of these cases will be discussed below.
126 See Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 336 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Brown-Forman and hold-
ing that a state law that regulates wholly outside the state's borders is invalid simply because
such a law exceeds the enacting state's inherent authority); Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579
(holding that when a state law directly regulates interstate commerce, it is struck down without
further inquiry).
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stated doctrine. In his argument against the use of the balancing test,
Donald Regan proposes that this test has grown up through language
from precedent that has been taken out of context, and that in prac-
tice, the Court does not engage in a true application of its balancing
doctrine.12' He proposes this to support the theory that the Court
should not and does not engage in a balancing test when deciding
the constitutionality of state laws, and instead only invalidates laws
with a protectionist purpose.2 I will apply this theory against the ex-
traterritoriality doctrine, illustrating that the Court has not in the past
struck down extraterritorial state laws simply for being so; that every
extraterritorial state law that it has struck down on this basis has also
been protectionist; and that the Court has likewise fashioned this ex-
traterritoriality doctrine from language in prior decisions taken out
of context. Consistent with its practice, if not its language, the Court
should uphold state laws with an extraterritorial reach, if there is no
unlawful purpose.
Before suggesting such a revision in dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine, I must emphasize that I am not advocating a doctrine that
allows states to impose their legislation on other states. As Donald
Regan observes, such "genuinely extraterritorial" legislation offends
the structure of the federal system as a whole by allowing states to
burden the autonomy interests of other states.12 9 That is not, how-
ever, a Commerce Clause issue. As Regan notes, states are forbidden
to legislate extraterritorially (as opposed to enacting legislation with
an extraterritorial reach) whether or not the regulation has anything
to do with commerce.130 However, there is a difference between pass-
ing legislation intended to have independent legal force in other ju-
risdictions and passing laws that reach out-of-state activity, such as the
Act. As the First Circuit correctly noted, "[t] he Act does not interfere
with regulatory schemes in other states." 3' If it did, it would be im-
permissible, no matter what it regulated and no matter what the mo-
tivation.
1 See Regan, supra note 57, at 1108-09.
'12 See id at 1108.
12 See Regan, supra note 57, at n.164. A corollary to this concept is the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, which requires state courts to respect the judgments of its sister state courts. See U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1.
ISO SeeRegan, supra note 57, at 1280. He notes that outside of the interstate commerce arena,
the Court has often located the prohibition on extraterritorial state action in the due process
clause. An example of impermissible extraterritorial legislation might be if Pennsylvania, which
requires its dog owners to register their pets, decided to subject NewJersey dog owners to this
requirement as well. Clearly, Pennsylvania has no right to do this. The legal issues surrounding
this type of extraterritorial legislation, notions such as procedural due process and personal
jurisdiction, are complex and beyond the scope of this Article. The reader should, however, be
able to intuitively see the distinction that I have made.
1 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66,82 (1st Cir. 2001). If the Act
did interfere with other states' regulatory schemes, other state governments would be challeng-
ing it. As noted below, the opposite is happening here, where other state governments support
Maine and hope to follow its example. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
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1. An Analysis of the Cases Upon Which the Supreme Court Has Relied
To Expand the Dormant Commerce Clause Reveals
That This Expansion Is Too Broad
In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority,
the first of the alcoholic beverage cases referenced above, the Court
states that "[w] hen a state statute directly regulates or discriminates
against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state
economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck
down the statute without further inquiry.' ', 32 To back this statement
up, it cites Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 3 a case involving a statute that
favored in-state interests over out-of-state interests; 134 Shafer v. Farmers
Grain Co., 5  a 1925 case that applied the old direct-indirect distinc-
tion 1 6 to a North Dakota law that did not regulate outside its borders,
but imposed what the Court determined to be a "direct" burden on
interstate commerce;137 Edgar v. MITE Corp.,ss a plurality opinion that
invalidated a state anti-takeover statute as an excessive burden on in-
terstate commerce;3 9 and Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice
40
a case involving in-state regulation that the Court also determined
imposed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Of
these cases, Philadelphia involved a clearly protectionist purpose,1
4 2
and evidence of a protectionist purpose influenced the Court's deci-
sion in Raymond. 43 That leaves Farmers Grain and MTE. Farmers
Grain, while involving a non-protectionist state law, is an old case, de-
cided under what is generally believed to be an obsolete doctine.
Donald Regan believes that if this case were decided today under
modem doctrine, 14 it would have been decided differently.
4 6
132 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579.
133 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
1 See id. at 626-27 (holding that NewJersey law banning waste coming from out-of-state from
being deposited in its landfills was protectionist and therefore violated the Commerce Clause).
136 268 U.S. 189 (1925).
Under this distinction, a law might be upheld if its impact on interstate commerce was not
direct. However, this was really just a way of measuring the extent of the burden on interstate
commerce. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 268. The doctrine's usefulness was
questioned by several Justices, and later gave way to the modem balancing test. See id. at 269.
See also Regan, supra note 57, at 1213 ("Shafer was written before the modem era by a justice
(Van Devanter) who believed in the direct/indirect test .. ").
137 See Farmers Grain, 268 U.S. at 199-200 (holding that North Dakota's law requiring grading
of wheat bought within the state imposed a direct burden on interstate commerce since about
90% of North Dakota's wheat was bought in order to be shipped in interstate commerce).18 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality opinion).
139 See id. at 646 (holding that Illinois Act imposed a substantial burden on interstate com-
merce and that such burden outweighed its putative local benefits).
140 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
141 See id. at 447.
142 See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27. See supra note 134 for a description of the law at issue.
143 See Raymond, 434 U.S. at 446-47.
144 This doctrine is the direct-indirect distinction under which a law might be upheld if its
effect on interstate commerce was not direct. See supra note 136 (discussing the early use of this
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M!TE is the only case the Court cites in Brown-Forman that impli-
cates a state law even remotely resembling the Maine law. The Illi-
nois anti-takeover law required a person making a tender offer for a
target company to notify the target and the Secretary of State of his
intent to tender twenty days before the offer became effective.' The
offer would become effective after the twenty days unless the Secre-
tary called a hearing to adjudicate the fairness of the offer.149 These
requirements were a little more restrictive than the federal anti-
takeover requirements.' The Court agreed that the law was uncon-
stitutional, but had a hard time agreeing on why. 1 The official the-
ory is that the law imposed an excessive burden on interstate com-
merce under the Pike balancing test. But Justice White, joined by
three others, opined that it was also an impermissible extraterritorial
regulation because a tender offeror would have to employ interstate
commerce facilities in communicating the offer,1 ,3 and the law could
be applied to regulate a tender offer that did not involve any Illinois
shareholders.' He also theorized that the statute was preempted by
the federal anti-takeover law. 5 It is the extraterritorial regulation
theory that is cited by Brown-Forman. But this theory was not en-
dorsed by a majority of the Court. This is significant given that, as
noted previously, this is the only moder' 5 dormant Commerce
test and its later decline).
145 Modem doctrine would strike down a law that (1) discriminated against interstate com-
merce, (2) unduly burdened interstate commerce under the Pike balancing test, (3) or regu-
lated across state lines. See supra Part lIM.B.1 for a full discussion of the modem dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. The North Dakota law in Farmers Grain did not regulate extraterri-
torially, so the third arm of the analysis would not be implicated. See supra note 137 for a de-
scirion of the law.
Regan, supra note 57, at 1213.
A "target company" was defined generally in the statute as a company 10% owned by Illi-
nois shareholders or a company (1) incorporated in Illinois, (2) having its principal executive




1,0 SeeRegan, supra note 57, at 1279.
5 The decision was a plurality in which five of the Justices agreed that the law unduly bur-
dened interstate commerce, and four decided it was also impermissible extraterritorial regula-
tion. See M!TE, 457 U.S. at 626 (breaking down the opinion into sections and noting the parts
joined by eachJustice).
152 This was the theory that five of the Justices could agree on. See id. at 646.
153 Such interstate facilities included the mall. See id. at 641.
154 This was because a target company was defined by the statute to be a company owned by
at least 10% Illinois shareholders or having its principal office in Illinois. Thus, a transaction
with shareholders of a target company would be unlikely to be with only Illinois shareholders.
Justice White also cited Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), a case involving
the market participation exception discussed earlier, Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945), a case that invalidated a state regulation of interstate trains as an impermissible burden
on interstate commerce, and Farmers Grain.
In See M1TE 457 U.S. at 634.
16 See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579.
157 This term is borrowed from Donald Regan, who based his theory on cases after 1934. See
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Clause case involving a state law that is not overtly protectionist. The
Court could not agree that the law should be invalidated simply for
regulating beyond its borders. One might ask why it was invalidated
at all given that it is not clearly protectionist. The theory that the
finding of a protectionist purpose is necessary to invalidate state laws
under the dormant Commerce Clause would only support invalida-
tion of this law if it were preempted. Justice White articulated this
thought, so there was certainly some support for it. In any event, this
case is not unequivocal precedent for per se invalidation of extraterri-
torial regulation, and, were there no preemption issue, it should not
have been struck down at all. In fact, this case does not clearly stand
for any particular doctrine.Iss Faced with a non-protectionist stat-
ute, 59 the Court could not agree that it violated the dormant Com-
merce Clause solely because of its supposedly extraterritorial reach.
The statement the Court makes in Brown-Forman is that it is irrele-
vant that a state regulation is addressed only to in-state actors if the
"practical effect" is to control prices in other states. 16 As authority for
this statement the Court cites Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,'16 a 1945
case involving state regulation of interstate trains that was determined
to impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. But
once again, it is not at all clear that this case is a persuasive authority.
Southern Pacific is a transportation case, which the Court cites as sup-
port in a movement-of-goods decision. Donald Regan argues that
transportation cases raise different interstate commerce issues than
do movement-of-goods cases, and that they should not be analyzed
under the same standards. 162 This is so, he says, because as a country
we have a national interest in effective transportation linking the
states in addition to our national interest in avoiding state protection-
ism, which he claims is the only national interest to be protected in
movement-of-goods cases. If one accepts this distinction, the Court
should not use transportation cases as precedent for deciding move-
ment-of-goods cases. Also, other constitutional scholars distinguish
between interstate commerce cases involving instrumentalities in in-
Rean, supra note 57, at 1093-94.
This is because it could have rested on three different theories. Donald Regan believes
that the Court wanted to reach the result of invalidation of the law. Given the disparate theo-
ries, however, one cannot place too much stock in how the Court reached this result. See Re-
gan, supra note 57, at 1279.
159 Regan notes that you could make a case for protectionism in that the law disproportion-
ately protected corporations located in Illinois and that the purpose of the law was to attract
businesses to locate in Illinois. See id. at 1279. This is a dubious position since state corporate
laws are often designed to attract corporations to a particular state and no one argues that this
violates the dormant Commerce Clause. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 101-03 (8th ed. 2000) (discussing states' incentives to design
corporation laws to attract corporations).
Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 583.
161 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
162 Regan, supra note 57, at 1184.
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terstate commerce and those involving goods being bought and sold
in interstate commerce, so as to suggest that there is an analytical dis-
tinction.l What this is, then, is a clear example of the Court taking
the words "practical effect" from a case arising out of a completely
different context than the Brown-Forman case did, with a resulting ex-
pansion of the dormant Commerce Clause that is unjustified. The
effects of state regulation on interstate commerce will be discussed in
more detail in section B, below.
In Healy v. Beer Institute,'4 the second alcoholic beverage case, the
Court relied principally on Brown-Forman and A.T1 6 5 This opinion
goes even further than the extraterritorial "practical effect" and states
that the law will be invalid regardless of the intent of the legislature.6 6
In both Brown-Forman and Beer Institute, as well as in G.A.F. Seelig,
the Court found it easy to invalidate the state laws in question be-
cause they all involved clear state protectionism.' 67 But in invalidating
these laws, the Court unnecessarily rested its analysis on the extrater-
ritorial effect of these laws.lH Instead, it should have simply invali-
dated all of them on grounds of economic protectionism.
Since the Court unnecessarily expanded its dormant Commerce
Clause analysis beyond economic protectionism, it has laid the unfor-
tunate groundwork for invalidation of the Act and laws similar to it.
When deciding cases involving the movement of goods in interstate
commerce, the Court has not had the need to invalidate non-
protectionist laws simply for their extraterritorial reach, nor has it
unequivocally done so.
The reason for this is that invalidation of such laws serves no dor-
mant Commerce Clause purpose. The principal purpose of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause is to prevent states from engaging in eco-
nomic protectionism. 69 Invalidation of the Act under the dormant
163 See GUNTHER & SULUVAN, supra note 67, at 299 (analyzing transportation cases separately
under a section called "State Burdens on Transportation").
164 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
16 Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 336 (citing both cases in its holding).
166 See id
167 See id at 329 (discussing the same type of law for beer); Bronm-Fonan, 476 U.S. at 576
(discussing the New York liquor pricing law which required sellers to charge its consumers the
lowest price charged to consumers in other states, thereby requiring out-of-state distributors to
surrender any economic advantage they may have had in other states); G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. at
522 (discussing the New York Milk Control Act, the purpose of which was to protect New York
farmers from out-of-state competition).
16 Indeed, in Beer Institute, Justice Scalia says as much, declining to endorse the majority's
extraterritorial effect analysis, and joining the holding on the grounds that the law was dis-
criminatory. See Beer.Inst., 491 U.S. at 345.
169 See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 580-81
(1997) (reiterating that economic isolationism is what the dormant Commerce Clause is there
to prevent). PhRMA refers to the goal of the dormant Commerce Clause as that of preventing
"Balkanization." See Plaintiff's Motion at 7, Pharm. Research & Mfs. of Am. (No. 00-157-B-H).
Such "Balkanization" is prevented by preventing state protectionism, not extraterritorial regula-
tion, however. See id.
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Commerce Clause does not serve this purpose. Maine does not seek
to give its industry or its consumers any economic advantage over the
industry or consumers of other states."' The only goal in passing this
legislation is to make what is an increasingly fundamental
1
healthcare need available to its residents. 7 2 It wishes to do this to en-
sure their health and well-being, a policy well within its traditional po-
lice power.'73 Since the law seeks to do this and nothing more, the
dormant Commerce Clause should not be grounds for its invalida-
tion.
2. A Comparison of the Act with State Laws That Have Been Struck
Down As Extraterritorial Reveals That These Invalidated Laws Could
Have Been Struck Down As Protectionist
A comparison of the Act with the liquor cases and G.A.F. Seelig
helps to illustrate that invalidated laws could have been struck down
as protectionist. The liquor cases reflected New York and Connecti-
cut's desire to obtain the lowest prices for liquor and beer for their
consumers vis-a-vis the consumers of other states. 174 These laws could
not be characterized as having anything but a protectionist purpose
since there is no convincing health or welfare purpose for making
liquor in New York or Connecticut as cheap or cheaper than it is in
other states.
Similarly, the law at issue in G.A.F. Seelig involved New York's de-
sire to protect its milk producers from out-of-state competition, i.e.,
to improve their economic position vis-a-vis milk producers in neigh-
boring states. In this case, New York attempted to justify its law as a
health and safety measure by claiming that it gave local producers the
financial wherewithal to produce clean and wholesome milk. The
Court was rightly unconvinced, since this theory would justify eco-
170 See Pharm. Research &Mfrs. ofAm, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *13 (acknowledging no
attempt by Maine to favor in-state business over out-of-state business, or to favor Maine consum-
ers over out-of-staters).
1
7'See GAO/T-HEHS-99-153, MEDICARE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR ADDING A PRESCRIPTION DRUG
BENEFIT (U.S. General Accounting Office 1999) (reporting that in the five years preceding
1999, the rise in prescription drug expenditures has more than doubled that of health care ex-
penditures overall, and noting the growing importance of prescription drugs as part of health
care). See also HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, STATE PHARMACEUTICAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS CONTINUE To GROW (September 18, 2000) (citing increased importance
of drug therapy in moder medicine leading to increased utilization of prescription drugs as
one of the most important factors in the rising cost of prescription drugs).
172 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681 (1) (West 2000) (citing the legislative finding that
affordability is critical in providing access to prescription drugs and stating that therefore the
goal of the Maine Rx Program is to make prescription drugs more affordable).
1S See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) ("It is a traditional exercise of States' 'police
powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens.'") (internal citations omitted).
This could only be regarded as an economic purpose; these states could not likely cite a
health or safety reason for making alcoholic beverages more affordable.
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nomic protectionism whenever a state could come up with a vaguely
plausible health and safety justification."5
In its motion, PhRMA compared the Act to the liquor cases and
suggested that Maine wished to obtain the lowest price possible for
prescription medications for its citizens vis-a-vis buyers of prescription
medication in other states, just as the states of New York and Con-
necticut did for their liquor and beer consumers in Brown-Forman and
Beer Institute. 1 6 In making this argument, PhRMA pointed to the pro-
vision in the Act that directs the Commissioner to seek rebates
equivalent to those that Maine receives under its Medicaid pro-
gram-'77 The rebates received under the Medicaid program are set by
federal law and are therefore applied nationally.'S PhRMA argued
that Maine's "benchmarking" of rebates under the Maine Rx Pro-
gram to the federal Medicaid rebate program is impermissible under
Brown-Forman and Beer Institute
79
The states in Brown-Forman and Beer Institute required distributors
of liquor and beer to tie the maximum price charged to consumers of
New York and Connecticut to the lowest price charged to consumers
in other states.'80 In Brown-Forman, distributors were required to limit
their prices to the lowest price charged nationwide. s In Beer Institute,
distributors were required to tie their prices to the lowest price
charged in neighboring states. 8 2 The clear goal of these laws was to
improve the economic position of New York and Connecticut con-
sumers vis-a-vis consumers of other states. 3
In contrast, Maine has no concern that its residents pay less or the
same price for prescription drugs than the residents of other states.'84
The state's sole purpose is to make prescription drugs more accessi-
ble to its residents through the use of a manufacturer's rebate.'8s The
17, See G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. at 523 ("Let such an exception be admitted, and all that a state
will have to do in times of stress and strain is to say that its farmers and merchants and workmen
must be protected against competition from without, lest they go upon the poor relief lists or
perish altogether.").
176 SeePlaintiff's Motion at 11, Pharm. Research &Mfrs. of Am. (No. 00-157-B-H).
17 SeeME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(4) (West 2000).
173 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(c) (1992) (detailing the rebate calculation for all state Medicaid
pro, ams).
See Plaintiff's Motion at 12, Pharm. Research &Mfrs. of Am (No. 00-157-B-H).
in See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 576 (discussing the New York liquor pricing law). See also
Beer InsL, 491 U.S. at 329 (discussing the same type of law for beer).
181 See Brown-Foman, 476 U.S. at 575.
182 See Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 326.
1 See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579 (noting that New York's asserted interest is obtaining
the lowest possible prices for its residents). The lowest possible price was to be no higher than
the price charged anywhere else. See id at 575. See also Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 326 (noting Con-
necticut's purpose of eliminating a price differential between beer sold in Connecticut and
beer sold in surrounding states so that its residents would not go to neighboring states to buy
it)I
See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *13 (noting that there
is no suggestion that Maine is trying to benefit the local economy).
The state has non-regulatory alternatives. For example, it could rely solely on its market
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Act simply uses a national standard to determine the amount of this
rebate. This is not prohibited "economic provincialism; 6 if any-
thing it is the opposite. Economic provincialism would exist if Maine
required rebates for its residents without having any regard for the
rebates that are sought nationally, and such rebates were greater than
the national norm.
This comparison reveals that in making this argument, PhRMA
put form over substance. The Court in Brown-Forman and Beer Insti-
tute did not invalidate the liquor and beer laws simply because they
"benchmarked." For example, it is doubtful that the Court would
have been as troubled by these laws if they had simply required the
distributors to set prices in New York and Connecticut in accordance
with a nationally accepted liquor pricing standard. What the Court
found offensive in these cases was the states' purpose: to improve the
economic position of their citizens vis-A-vis that of the citizens of
other states.187 The Act's use of the Medicaid rebate amounts shows
that this so-called "benchmarking" can be done without a purpose
that offends the dormant Commerce Clause.
Comparison of the Maine statute to G.A.F. Seelig is also instructive
because here we have a state law, similar to the law in G.A.F. Seelig,
that seeks to regulate prices. But here, unlike in G.A.F. Seelig, the
state has a genuine health and welfare purpose, and no concurrent
protectionist purpose. The G.A.F. Seelig case thus illustrates the erro-
neous breadth of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The
Court in G.A.F Seeligwas not confronted with the situation under the
dormant Commerce Clause where a state attempts to regulate prices
for purely health and welfare reasons, but its language unnecessarily
includes such efforts.' 8 The Court could have simply invalidated the
New York law on the ground that it was protectionist without making
the sweeping statement that any state law affecting extraterritorial
transactions violates the dormant Commerce Clause. r8 As the Court's
language suggests, its decision would have been much more difficult
had the State of New York passed its Milk Control Act for purely
health and welfare reasons as the Court clearly recognized the impor-
power without the addition of regulatory enforcement. In fact, Maine has explored this avenue
as well. See Maine Department of Human Services Press Release, Maine Joins Vermont, New
Hampshire in Tri-State Drug Program (Oct. 24, 2000) available at http://www.state.me.us/dhs/
pressx.htm. The three states have formed a purchasing coalition to negotiate discounts for
residents of all three states. See id.
186 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 590 (discussing G.A.F. Seelig as a classic case of such provincial-
ism).-
See Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 339 (citing Brown-Forman and stating that states may not deprive
out-of-state consumers and businesses of whatever economic advantage they may possess in
their local markets).
iss See G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. at 521 ("New York has no power to project its legislation into
Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired there.").
im See id
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tance of the states' role in this area.9 ' It certainly could not have
foreseen' 9' that one day these words would be used to prohibit states
from enacting important health policy.192  If this case should ever
come before the Court, it will have to either narrow its current doc-
trine, or decide that the Constitution prohibits states from regulating
drug prices, even when they find such regulation necessary in order
to fulfill their responsibility to ensure their citizens' health. Since this
perverse outcome does not serve any dormant Commerce Clause
purpose,9 3 and in fact prevents the states from fulfilling their du-
ties, 9' the Court should choose the former course.
The above comparisons show that the Act is not like the laws in-
validated in the earlier cases, in that it has no protectionist purpose.
In addition, it has a social welfare purpose that is well within Maine's
police power and responsibility. 195 Since the principal purpose of the
dormant Commerce Clause is to prevent state economic protection-
ism, the Court's dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is too broad be-
cause it would invalidate a state law that not only does not offend this
principal, but which furthers a state's social responsibility to its citi-
zens.
B. A Speculative Discriminatory Effect Alone Should
Not Invalidate the Act
Up to this point the argument has been that a dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine that is true to the principles behind its devel-
opment would only invalidate state laws that have a protectionist, or
discriminatory, purpose.96 The last section has been spent making
the case for why a law with an extraterritorial effect should not be
struck down on those grounds, if it lacks a protectionist purpose.
1 The Court listed several state regulations that affect interstate commerce but that were
held to be legitimate exercises of police power, such as regulations governing the importation
of diseased livestock or decayed food, and regulations prohibiting fraudulent advertising. None
of the regulations listed involved price regulation. See id. at 525.
191 See id. The fact that none of the regulations that the Court recited as within the states'
police power involve price regulation indicates an assumption by the Court that economic regu-
lation and health and welfare regulation are generally mutually exclusive.
19 See Robert Kuttner, The American Health Care System: Health Insurance Coverage, 340 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 163, 166 (1999) (noting the trend toward a reduction in insurance coverage, no-
tably in pharmaceutical coverage, whose costs are rapidly rising; and that among the elderly,
who are the most dependent on prescription drugs, about half of Medicare enrollees have no
prescription drug coverage). Given these trends and statistics, governmental intervention is
certainly needed.
193 This is because the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause is to prevent state eco-
nomic protectionism. As noted previously, it is undisputed that Maine is not engaging in eco-
nomic protectionism.
19 States have been traditionally charged with social welfare responsibilities, including the
health of their citizens. See MICHAEL S. SPARER, MEDICAID AND THE LIMITS OF STATE HEALTH
REFORM 185 (1996) (discussing the drawbacks of state-controlled health care policy).
195 See supra note 173 (discussing states' police power).
1I use both words interchangeably to mean protectionist.
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However, one argument that can be made against the Act is its poten-
tially discriminatory effect. The Court has invalidated laws that are
non-discriminatory on their face but that discriminate in favor of the
state in operation. 9 In this case, it may be argued that if the Act were
allowed to go into effect, the drug makers would respond by raising
their prices for the residents of other states. There are several rea-
sons for dismissing this argument.
First, as previously discussed, in past cases where the Court has in-
validated a law with a discriminatory effect, there was also evidence of
a protectionist purpose.' 98 Donald Regan, in his effort to place all of-
fending laws under the protectionist purpose rubric, has proposed
that a discriminatory effect should only be evidence of such a pur-
pose.'99 In this case, we already know there is no protectionist pur-
pose.200 Therefore, if one subscribes to Regan's view, any discrimina-
tory effect of the Act should be irrelevant.
Even without the use of Regan's theory, since the Court has typi-
cally inferred a protectionist purpose when it invalidates laws due to a
discriminatory effect,20 ' it would seem that an effect alone should not
be a basis for invalidating the Act. As an aside, the Court has also
measured the disparate effects of state laws using the Pike test,
20 2
which does not apply to the Act.20 3 And in the balancing context of
the Pike test, as Regan observes, the Court usually finds a protectionist
purpose as well. °4
197 See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-53
(1977) (invalidating a North Carolina law that forbade the selling of apples in the state that did
not bear a USDA grade on the package, thereby excluding Washington, and its apples bearing
state grades, from the North Carolina market).
198 See, e.g., id. at 351-52 (including a statement by the North Carolina Agriculture Commis-
sioner suggesting he thought there was a protectionist purpose, and the fact that the main sup-
porters of the law were North Carolina apple producers). Donald Regan goes through all of
the major cases and finds a similar protectionist purpose where the Court purportedly struck
the law at issue down for its discriminatory effect. See Regan, supra note 57, at 1209-84.
199 SeeRegan, supra note 57, at 1095. Since he argues that the Court has only invalidated laws
with a protectionist purpose, he is saying that the Court has in practice only used a protectionist
effect as such evidence. See supra note 198 (discussing laws struck down for having a discrimina-
tory effect that had a protectionist purpose).
00 SeePharm. Research &Mfts. of Am., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *13 (acknowledging no
attempt by Maine to favor in-state business over out-of-state business, or to favor Maine consum-
ers of prescription drugs over out-of-state consumers).
201 See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 289 (noting that it is used to uncover a dis-
criminatory motive or where the Court avoids attributing a discriminatory motive but wishes to
invalidate the law).
202 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
203 The Pike test applies when a law has only an incidental effect on interstate commerce, not
one that directly regulates in interstate commerce, such as the Act. See supra note 108 and ac-
companying text. As previously noted, my assessment that the Act directly regulates in inter-
state commerce disagrees with the First Circuit's analysis, which found no direct regulation,
thus allowing it to apply the Pike test.
204 Donald Regan's argument that the Court finds a protectionist purpose in the state laws it
strikes down as too burdensome is discussed above. See discussion supra note 198.
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In sum, whether or not the Court overtly uses a discriminatory ef-
fect as evidence of a protectionist purpose, such a purpose seems to
be necessary to the conclusion that a law with such effect is unconsti-
tutional. Since we know there is no such purpose in enactment of
the Maine law, any disparate effect should not be a basis for invalida-
tion of it.
Second, any discriminatory effect is pure speculation. While there
is some evidence that the drug makers' response to a price regulation
would be a price increase in some other sector,205 and policymakers
have raised this concern in attempting to formulate federal prescrip-
tion drug laws,06 it is not a viable basis for preemptively invalidating a
law without any evidence of a protectionist motive.
As noted previously, when the Court invokes a protectionist effect,
it usually infers a protectionist purpose and often does so in the con-
text of balancing the benefits and burdens of the law. Here, there is
no protectionist motive, so the Court could only raise the issue of pro-
tectionist effect in the context of a balancing test. Balancing, how-
ever, does not apply to this case. But even if it were to aply, how can
the Court balance a hypothetical discriminatory effect? And since
whether such a discriminatory effect occurs depends on the actions
of the parties challenging this law, isn't such an effect somewhat sus-
pect? We can dispose of the idea that the Court should balance hy-
pothetical harms also by simply remembering that the Court does not
make a practice of answering questions that have not yet arisen.
Such questions of policy are generally left to legislatures,2°9 and if
20 See GAO/HEHS-00-118, EXPANDING ACCESS TO FEDERAL PRICES COULD CAUSE OTHER
PRICE CHANGES (U.S. General Accounting Office 2000) (reporting on the possibility that drug
manufacturers could raise their prices overall in response to addition of a prescription drug
benefit under Medicare if the Medicare plan extracted the same discounts that other current
federally-funded prescription drug plans do). See also FIONA SCoTr MORTON, THE STRATEGIC
RESPONSE BY PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS TO THE MEDICAID MOST-FAVORED CUSTOMER RULES 29
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5717, 1996) (reporting that the rules,
which required drug manufacturers to give most favored customer discounts to state Medicaid
programs, resulted in higher prices in some drugs to non-Medicaid consumers). However, the
results of her study were not overwhelming. See id.
See GAO/HEHS-00-118, supra note 205, at 3-4 (acknowledging that this report is in re-
sponse to Congress' request for a study of the possible impact of a Medicare drug benefit on
dry prices).
For example, in Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), the Court
was faced with a state law that had a discriminatory effect that was manifest, not hypothetical.
North Carolina's facially neutral labeling law effectively prevented Washington State from sell-
ing apples in North Carolina. This is very different from the present case where any possible
disparate pricing effect in favor of Maine is no more than a guess.
See, e.g., Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 538 (1st Cir. 1995)
(noting that courts should avoid answering hypothetical questions). See also U.S. CONST. art. Ill,
§ 2, cl. 1 (limiting federal courts' jurisdiction to cases and controversies that have actually
arisen).
See Redish & Nugent, supra note 61, at 581 (arguing against use of the dormant Com-
merce Clause by stating that when courts decide whether the nature of a type of interstate
commerce requires national regulation, it is making an intrinsically legislative determination).
See also RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 426 (3d ed. 1998) (distinguishing between
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Congress were to determine that this potentially discriminatory effect
was a danger, it could preempt the Maine law.2'
Finally, weighing in a hypothetical discriminatory effect without
any protectionist purpose does not serve any constitutional purpose.
We have seen that the Court has not deviated from this principle by
only invokin a discriminatory effect when there is also a protection-
ist purpose.
Donald Regan has also looked at the protectionist effect from the
standpoint of the national interest that the dormant Commerce
Clause is meant to serve. He discusses it in the context of balancing,
which he and I would both argue should not apply here.2  But it is
worth discussing as a practical matter because the effect of legislation
on drug prices is of such concern. 3 In Regan's view, the only na-
tional interest to be served by the dormant Commerce Clause where
the movement of goods is involved is that of preventing purposeful
214state protectionism. All other interests are constitutionally irrele-
vant, including the interests of private parties. Such private interests,
Regan says, are to be considered by legislatures-whether they be
state or federal-not by courts.1
In this case, the district court in Maine noted that the effect of the
Act might be to raise drug prices in other sectors. 6 Applying Regan's
argument, this private interest of drug consumers outside of Maine
should not be relevant to a reviewing court. Since a discriminatory
effect on a private interest should not be relevant to a court, whether
or not lower drug prices in Maine effect drug prices elsewhere should
have no significance at all in determining whether there is a constitu-
tional violation.
adjudicative facts as those about the parties to a particular proceeding that help a tribunal de-
cide a particular issue regarding that particular party; and legislative facts as more general ones
that help a tribunal decide questions of law or policy).
210 See Redish & Nugent, supra note 61, at 573-74 (arguing that state laws affecting interstate
commerce should only be overturned by Congress).
211 This is discussed more fully above. See supra text accompanying notes 201-04.
212 Regan would say it does not apply here because balancing should never apply. See Regan,
supra note 57, at 1108. See also supra text accompanying note 128. But even if the Court should
balance, balancing cannot apply here, where the Act's effects on interstate commerce are not
incidental. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
21 See GAO/HEHS-00-1 18, supra note 205, at 3 (acknowledging Congress' concern about the
dru makers' response to price regulation).
21 See Regan, supra note 57, at 1104.
See id. at 1103 (arguing that private interests are for legislative consideration and constitu-
tionally irrelevant). Regan also notes that it is antithetical to our system of separate states to
require the state legislators to consider unrepresented out-of-state interests when it enacts legis-
lation. Nor is it practical, since such a requirement effectively transfers to state governments
responsibilities equivalent to those of the federal government, without the corresponding re-
sources or expertise. See id. at 1165.
216 See Pharm. Research &Mfts. of Am., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *13 n.10.
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The argument that any discriminatory effect should not invalidate
the Maine law can also be supported from the point of view of other
states. Should a state regulation have the effect of infringing on
other state interests as opposed to private interests, it becomes consti-
tutionally relevant because such a law is much more likely to have a
protectionist purpose. In fact, Christopher Drahozal has observed
that the Supreme Court is more likely to strike down a state law when
another state government participates in its challenge.218 States usu-
ally participate by joining suits by private parties to invalidate dis-
criminatory state laws.219 Drahozal based his observation on his study
of several important Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause
cases.220 This conclusion makes sense because if a state law economi-
cally disadvantages other states, as opposed to private parties within
the other states, it is a paradigm case of protectionism. 2 2 ' There is
certainly no party in a better position to determine if such protection-
ism exists than another state. But if we look to the reaction of other
states to the Act, we do not see opposition; we instead see a desire to
follow suit.222 This strongly suggests that allowing the law to stand will
not offend the basic purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 214 and 215 (discussing the constitutional relevance of
preventing purposeful state protectionism as opposed to protecting private interests).
218 Christopher R. Drahozal, Preserving the American Common Market: State and Local Govern-
ments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 Sup. Cr. ECON. REv. 233, 236 (1999). Drahozal makes
this observation to support his theory that states act as "fire alarms," bringing dormant Com-
merce Clause violations to the attention of the Court. See id. at 278.
219 See id. at 249.
2 See id. at 254-55 (explaining the sample of cases that Drahozal used).
221 See Drahozal, supra note 218, at 269 (noting that the presence of private party litigants in
dormant Commerce Clause cases had no relationship to the outcome of the case). An excel-
lent example of a state participating in litigation opposing a state law is Philadelphia v. NewJersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978), which pitted the City of Philadelphia against the state of New Jersey. In
this case, the NewJersey law at issue prohibited out-of-state waste from being dumped in New
Jersey's landfills. In addition to the fact that a local government was a party opposing the New
Jersey law, other states participated by submitting amicus briefs in opposition. Consistent with
Drahozal's theory, the NewJersey law was struck down. See Drahozal, supra note 218, at app. A
(the appendix is a table of the cases Drahozal studied, showing the participating parties and the
outcome of the case).
=2 See, e.g., Tony Pugh, States Ty To Limit Rises in Drug Prices, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 28, 2000,
at C4 (quoting Peter Shumlin, Chairman of the Northeast Legislative Association on Drug
Prices, on the "tremendous" interest from other states in new state prescription drug price con-
trol policy initiatives); Marketletter, Seniors Slam Stay on Maine Rx Drug Price Bill, Nov. 20, 2000
(quoting National Council of Senior Citizens president George Kourpias' prediction that "other
states will soon follow Maine's lead"); Rachel Zimmerman & Laurajohannes, SmithKline Maine
MoveFinds Suppor4 WALL ST.J., Aug. 7, 2000, at B6 (quoting Maine Rx sponsor Chellie Pingree
saying that "at least 20 states have expressed interest in passing a similar law" to that of Maine).
There has been support from other states as well. See Carey Goldberg, Maine Enacts a Law Aimed
at Controlling Cost of Drugs, N.Y. TiMES, May 12,2000, atA30 (quoting a member of the Vermont
senate as saying that the Maine legislation is a "victory").
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C. Current Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine Rests On Inaccurate
Structural Assumptions About the States'Political Power
One of the possible justifications for the dormant Commerce
Clause (or any otherjudicially imposed limitation on state power) 2 is
that Congress can override any limits imposed by it.22  This, of
course, assumes that states can convince Congress that such overrid-
ing is necessary. Martin Redish and Shane Nugent have persuasively
argued that this assumption is erroneous due to inherent congres-
sional inertia.22 5 Fernando LaGuarda has gone a step further and ar-
gued that in the area of health policy, states lack the political power
necessary to be heard over powerful private interest groups who op-
pose them.22 6 This would only exacerbate inherent Congressional in-
ertia where these powerful private interest groups favor the status
quo. This section of the Comment will show the legitimacy of these
arguments through their application to the current healthcare crisis
that fostered the enactment of the Act.
1. To Combat Congressional Inertia and To Peform Their Roles As Policy
Innovators, States Need To Be Able To Enact Non-Protectionist Laws,
Even If Those Laws Affect Interstate Commerce
Beginning with Redish and Nugent, as an initial matter, they ar-
gue that the dormant Commerce Clause is illegitimate in its en-
tirety.2 27 Absent the dormant Commerce Clause, states would be free
to legislate where such legislation is not preempted. 8 Congress has
the power, preemptively or subsequently, to preempt any state laws it
determines to impinge too greatly on interstate commerce2 9 This,
they maintain, comports with our federalist ideal of concurrent
power between sovereign states and the federal government with ac-
companying structural checks and balances because states have the
power to legislate on behalf of their constituents, and Congress has
223 Such a limitation would be, for example, ajudicial determination of federal preemption.
22 See Redish & Nugent, supra note 61, at 570 (noting that it is accepted that Congress may
choose to overrule the judicial invalidation of a particular state regulation by statutorily author-
izing it).
See id. at 573.
26 See LaGuarda, supra note 42, at 171 (describing the massive activity of private interest
groups).
7 See Redish & Nugent, supra note 61, at 572. I do not adopt this argument, because, based
on its decisions, the Supreme Court appears to believe that there is a place for the dormant
Commerce Clause. Also, consistent with the discussion below, states lacking political power may
have difficulty convincing Congress to invalidate a protectionist state law that directly harms
them, and would thus benefit from the Court's intervention. However, the Redish and Nugent
argument is fully applicable to the Act because, as a non-protectionist law, the dormant Com-
merce Clause should not apply to it.
28 See id, at 592.
See id.
[Vol. 4:1
Nov. 2001] RE-EVALUATION OFTHEDORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 217
the preemptive check on that power.23° The dormant Commerce
Clause shifts this balance away from the states by allowing the Court,
on challenge by a (usually) private party, to invalidate state legisla-
tion.231 The states, in order to achieve their legislative goal, must then
approach Congress and convince it to reverse the Court's decision.232
Beyond the fact that this shift is inconsistent with our federalist struc-
ture,s inherent congressional inertia prevents states from succeeding
much in getting the Court's decision reversed. 2m  Redish and Nugent
further add that this shift stifles the states' ability to act as "small-scale
social laboratories, so that other states-or the federal government
itself-might benefit from the experience without incurring all of the
possible risks that might result from a similar nationwide experi-
ment."2's
Application of some of these principles to the healthcare debate
and to the Act supports these scholars' contentions. Congressional
inertia cannot be disputed in the area of healthcare reform, notably
in the area of prescription drugs.2 6 The debate over how to provide a
prescription drug benefit to senior citizens has been raging for some
time237 without resolution.m The fact that Congress has been unable
to devise a meaningful solution to this problem is one of the princi-
20 See i&
231 See i.
232 See id. at 592-93.
2" This is discussed above. See supra text accompanying note 228.
See Redish & Nugent, supra note 61, at 593. Inherent congressional inertia is used to de-
scribe the extremely slow and uncertain legislative process, and the fact that Congress has more
ofa.propensity not to act than to act. See id.
" Id. at 598.
A discussion of this phenomenon follows.
237 This debate centers on how to add a prescription drug benefit to Medicare. Members of
Congress have been proposing solutions at least as far back as 1993. See, e.g., H.R. 2673, 103rd
Cong. (1993) (introducing a law that would add a prescription drug benefit to Medicare). See
also Mark McClellan et al., Designing a Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit: Issues, Obstacles, and Op-
portunities, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 26 (2000) (outlining some of the various prescription drug pro-
posals that have been introduced beginning in 1998); Ramesh Ponnuru, Dr. Feelgood: Bush and
GorePeddle TheirDrugPlan, NATIONAL REVIEW (Sept. 25, 2000), at http://wvwv.findarticles.com/
cf_0/m1282/18_52/66106572/print.jhtml (discussing the presidential candidates' competing
prescription drug plans during the 2000 election).
Congress was able to come up with one piece of legislation. In 2000, President Clinton
signed a law that would allow wholesalers to import drugs from abroad, in order to take advan-
tage of the lower prices in other countries. See Robert Lenzner & Tomas Kellner, Corporate Sabo-
teurs, FORBES, Nov. 27, 2000, at 156. However, outgoing Health and Human Services Secretary
Donna Shalala refused to implement the law, which required her endorsement, citing "flaws
and loopholes." See Marc Kaufman, Shalala Rejects GOP Drug Price Law, WASH. POST, Dec. 27,
2000, at Al. As of this writing, Shalaa's successor under the Bush administration Tommy
Thompson has also decided to put implementation of the law on hold. See Health Care and
Benefits in Brief, Health Costs: Thompson Dubious About Possibility of Certifng Safety of Reimported
Drugs, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY REP., May 30, 2001, at 16. Thus for now, we are back to un-
controlled drug prices and, of course, still no Medicare drug benefit. See A Conversation with
Gail R Wlensky, POLICY & PRACTICE OF PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES, 2000 WL 18991175 (June 1,
2000) (noting that Medicare does not cover prescription drugs).
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pal reasons for enactment of the Maine law.239 If a court holds that
Maine may not exercise its regulatory powers to control the cost of
prescription drugs, Maine will have to wait for Congress to arrive at its
own solution, something Congress has thus far been unable to do.
Alternately, Maine will have to try to convince Congress to reverse the
court's decision by passing legislation allowing states to regulate drugpricsars stt lns 2 4 0  ..
ices across state Ies, 0arocess that is inherently expensive, time-
consuming, and uncertain.
Alternatively, if Maine is able to implement its cost-control
scheme, other states and the federal government could observe the
law's success or failure and benefit from Maine's experience.242 The
state governments can use this knowledge to devise their own pro-
grams to control prescription drug costs, while the federal govern-
ment can use it to learn what works and what does not without the
dangers of entering into a national experiment.
This idea that states should act as "laboratories" for enactment of
social or economic policy innovations is not just rhetoric.243 It is actu-
ally used by states and the federal government, nowhere more no-
ticeably than in the area of health care reform."" In its ongoing ef-
fort to devise a prescription drug benefit under Medicare, Congress
has looked carefully at state pharmacy benefit programs to see how
they address cost and access issues and what administrative problems
they face, with an eye to incorporating features of the more successful
state efforts. 45 Likewise, states that wish to add price regulation of
prescription drugs to their own pharmacy benefit programs, or who
have yet to implement one, are watching this case closely. If the
Maine law is ultimately upheld, many states will follow Maine's lead. 46
239 See Rebecca Lentz, Drug (Price) Rehab: States Get a Handle on ControllingPharmaceutical Costs,
MODERN PHYSICIAN (Aug. 1, 2000), 2000 WL 8130512 (quoting a Maine Department of Human
Services spokesperson as saying "'[w] e were tired of waiting'" for Congress to act and a Vermont
official as saying "' [i]f there were federal relief, the state wouldn't have to get into it'").
240 This could be done via either the Medicaid prior authorization provision or through di-
rect regulation.
241 See Redish & Nugent, supra note 61, at 592-93 (discussing the long and uncertain process
of introducing, passing, and getting a bill signed into law, and the slim odds of success in this
endeavor).
2 See LaGuarda, supra note 42, at 160 (arguing that states should act as laboratories for
healthcare reform).
243 This idea originated from the famous quote by justice Louis Brandeis in New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
244 See Robert Pear, Shifting of Powerftom Washington Is Seen Under Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2001, at 18 (noting that health care is a notable example of states leading the way on domestic
policy issues). See also SPARER, supra note 194, at 28-29 (explaining the bipartisan turn to the
states to implement health care reform in the 1990's).
245 See GAO/HEHS-00-162, STATE PHARMACY PROGRAMS: ASSISTANCE DESIGNED TO TARGET
COVERAGE AND STRETCH BUDGETS, (U.S. General Accounting Office 2000) (reporting to the
House of Representatives Commerce Committee on what were in 1999 fourteen state pharmacy
programs).
See supra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing other states' interest in the success
of the Act and a desire to follow Maine's lead).
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2. The Court Should Uphold Non-Protectionist State Laws in
Recognition of the States' Political Disadvantage Since
Those Laws Do Not Offend the Dormant Commerce Clause
An exacerbation of the problem of Congress' inability to act in
the prescription drug arena is the political power of the pharmaceu-
tical industry in comparison to that of the states. Fernando LaGuarda
argues that the Court has inaccurately supposed that states have the
political advantage when it has ruled to limit state power.4 He ar-
gues that the Court has assumed that since our federal structure and
the Constitution provide inherent safeguards for states in the political
arena, principally by delegating control of the electoral process to
them, that this protection ensures that laws that unduly burden them
will not be promulgated. 2 8 He contends that this assumption is in-
correct, and that in reality, states are no more influential in the po-
litical process than private interest groups.249 In fact, since they repre-
sent a wider array of interests and have less money, they are less
politically influential than private interest groups.2° This is not the
position our Constitution and federal structure intended for the
states to be in.251 Therefore, since it is the Court's responsibility to
maintain the proper balance of power between the states and the
federal government,252 it should stop assuming that states can prevail
politically on even equal footing with other interest groups, and ac-
count for this inadequacy when it rules on the limits of state power.
LaGuarda then applies his argument to healthcare reform24 to
show that federal laws and regulations have impeded states in their
efforts to enact important health policy.25 And they have been un-
247 See LaGuarda, supra note 42, at 165.
248 See id& at 168. LaGuarda examines the opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authoity, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) to support his argument. In that case, the Court held that the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act applied to state and local governments. In support of this de-
cision, the Court said that if the federal law intruded too much on states, the political process
would correct this, not the Court. See id at 556 ("The political process ensures that laws that
unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.").
249 See LaGuarda, supra note 42, at 170 (arguing that the legislative process is not more in-
herentiy deferential to states than it is to other interest groups). See also Pear, supra note 244
(offering the hope that the new administration will recognize that states are political entities
and not interest groups).
25 See LaGuarda, supra note 42 (describing how states are like interest groups without
money, while having to satisfy both national constituencies and local voters).
251 See id. at 163 (arguing that the federal government was intended to co-exist with inde-
pendent sovereign states).
252 See id at 166 (arguing that the Framers' ideals of state sovereignty must be guarded by the
courts). The proper federal balance in LaGuarda's view would have the states, as sovereign en-
tities, exerting more influence than private interests. See id
Z3 See i& at 190-91 (contending that the Court should heed the argument that states are dis-
regrded in the political process, and intervene on their behalf).
25 LaGuarda's argument is based on the situation as it stood in 1993.
Notable obstacles that LaGuarda cites are the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
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able to convince Congress to alter or repeal these legal obstacles2 6
because they are opposed by powerful private interest groups who
have a stake in maintaining the status quo.
LaGuarda's argument resonates strongly today in the context of
access to prescription drugs, despite its relative antiquity in the uni-
verse of rapidly changing health policy. The situation is somewhat
different in that here, the area in which states have been unsuccessful
is convincing the federal government to enact legislation addressing
this problem, as opposed to convincing it to remove an existing statu-
tory or regulatory obstacle. Nevertheless, the states face a pharma-
ceutical industry with a tremendous interest in maintaining the status
quo.58 Congress' actions leave little doubt as to who has the political
advantage. The states, with their limited budgets and various inter-
of 1974 ("ERISA") and the Medicaid waiver process, both of which he claims severely limit state
health care reform efforts. See LaGuarda, supra note 42, at 170. I will update his account of
these federal obstacles here. The comprehensive Medicaid waiver about which LaGuarda pri-
marily speaks has become easier to obtain in recent years as the health care crisis has become
more pronounced. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 45, at 879. Waivers are also obtained by ap-
plication to the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") and are not the subject of
legislation. See id. Thus HCFA can approve a waiver even if it is opposed politically. For exam-
ple, PhRMA has challenged the HCFA's recent waiver grant to Vermont that allows its residents
without prescription drug coverage to take advantage of the state's Medicaid discount. See Ross
Sneyd, Drug Industry Sues To Block Vt. Program, RUTLAND HERALD ONLINE (Dec. 14, 2000),
http://rutlandherald.nybor.com/toprint/16955.htm. PhRMA has been more successful in
this effort than it was with its Maine Rx challenge. In June, 2001, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed a district court's refusal to enjoin implementation of Ver-
mont's Medicaid waiver, holding that the HCFA did not have authority under the Medicaid law
to allow non-Medicaid beneficiaries to benefit from the Medicaid rebate. See Pharm. Research
& Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
However, ERISA remains a powerful obstacle for states because it precludes states from
requiring employers to provide their employees with health coverage, the so-called "employer
mandate." See SPARER, supra note 194, at 6. It also precludes participants in employee benefit
plans who are injured by plan administrators from seeking any meaningful relief under state
laws. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 45, at 808-16 (discussing ERISA preemption of state laws
and beneficiaries' limited rights under the statute). Despite a great deal of hostile commentary,
the fact that federal judges are forced to deny relief to sympathetic claimants, and the fact that
states perceive the statute as an obstacle to state health care reform, the law has not been
amended and is unlikely to be amended any time soon. See id. at 815.
256 See supra note 255 (discussing obstacles to state health care reform efforts).
257 The interest groups opposing an amendment to ERISA are principally large employers
and unions. See LaGuarda, supra note 42, at 183. Opposition to state Medicaid waivers has
come from various healthcare provider groups. See id. at 188 (recounting opposition to Ore-
gon's request for a Medicaid waiver that would have eliminated coverage for certain services
ordinarily covered by Medicaid). The pharmaceutical industry has joined this action too, as its
challenge to the Vermont waiver illustrates. See supra note 255.
25 The status quo is the drug manufacturers' profit margins, currently the highest among
U.S. industries. See Merrill Goozner, The Price Isn't Right, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Sept. 11, 2000, at
25, available at 2000 WL 4739423. The drug companies claim that they need to charge high
prices in order to invest in research and development for new cures. However, this does not
explain a need for such high profits, since profit numbers are net of research and development
expenditures. In addition, taxpayers pay for a good portion of the cost of research for new
cures. See id.
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ests,2s compete for the ears of Congress with pharmaceutical compa-
nies, their seemingly unlimited budgets,26° and their single interest of
seeing nothing change. Since Congress has done nothing, 1 it thus
appears that the drug makers have won.
The intervention of the Supreme Court is therefore necessary. If
it is the Court's role to maintain a federal-state balance of power
where the states truly have more political significance than interest
groups,262 the Court must recognize the states' disadvantage in Wash-
ington and protect them.
The Court should recognize that Maine passed this law because
Congress has done nothing to make prescription drugs more afford-
able for the citizens of Maine. Congress, instead, has chosen to con-
tinue to protect the interests of the pharmaceutical industry.2M 4 The
Court should correct this imbalance by finding the law constitutional,
rather than further subverting the political significance of the states
with the limitations of the dormant Commerce Clause.
D. Who Says Uniform Laws Are Essential?
This Comment will address one final argument for limiting
Maine's power to regulate drug prices. The pharmaceutical industry
argues that a "patchwork" of state laws would be too burdensome,
and if there is to be any regulation, it must be national.'6
z See La~uarda, supral note 42, at 170 (arguing that states are like interest groups without
the moneywhile having to satisfy both national constituencies and local voters).
26 See, e.g.,Julian Borger, Dyingfor Drugs: Industry That Stalks the U.S. Corridors of Power, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 13, 2001, at 3 (noting that no interest group wields as much political power as
PhRMA, a group he describes as "breathtaking for its deep pockets and aggression, even by the
standards of U.S. politics"); PBS NewsHour withfim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 21,
2000) (discussing the fact that the campaign spending by the pharmaceutical industry for the
Bush-Gore election approached that of a political party); Jeff Leeds, Health Care Firms Spend Big
To Head Off Reforms, LA. TIMES, July 23, 2000, at Al (reporting that the pharmaceutical and
health insurance industries waged "the largest national advertising campaign ever conducted by
a political special interest" for the Bush-Gore election).261
Indeed, over the years, Congress has passed a series of laws that have directly benefited
the pharmaceutical industry. See AMERICAN POLIrCAL NETWORK, INC., PoLITIcs & PoLIcY Rx
DRUG COSTS II: INDUSTRY HAS UNSEEN INFLUENCE, AMERICAN HEALTH LINE 6 (2000) (noting
that the pharmaceutical industry has had a decade of legislative successes such as tax breaks,
speedier approval of drugs and patent extensions). But see supra note 238 for a discussion of
Congress' so far failed effort to reduce drug costs through importation from foreign countries.
26 See LaGuarda, supra note 42, at 165; see also supra note 254 (discussing LaGuarda's argu-
ment that maintaining a federal and state balance is a role of the Supreme Court).
263 This disadvantage is discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 257-60.
264 See supra note 261 (discussing the various ways that Congress has benefited the pharma-
ceutical industry).
265 See Lentz, supra note 239, at 1 (quoting a PhRMA spokesperson saying that the "last thing
we need is a patchwork of differing and conflicting state laws" and asserting that the problem of
access to prescription drugs requires a "national solution"). Supporters of the drug industry
also argue against price regulation as offending the free market. See Glenn G. Lammi, Maine
Drug Price Control Act Vulnerable To Legal Chalenge, LEGAL OPINION LETTER, July 14, 2000, at 2
(calling the Maine law an "awkward attempt to replace the market mechanism"). However, the
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The pharmaceutical industry, however, is not the body charged
with making that determination; Congress is. Congress has not said
that a patchwork of laws is unworkable.266 Until it does, the "patch-
work" argument should not be used in support of invalidation of state
laws under the dormant Commerce Clause. As discussed previously,
the pharmaceutical industry has plenty of means to persuade Con-
gress that it is unworkable; it does not need to have a court decide
this.
Nor should a court consider this factor. Donald Regan's argu-
ment remains strong; the only interest of constitutional significance
with respect to the movement of goods in interstate commerce is the
267 atineett tprevention of economic protectionism. The private interest that
pharmaceutical companies have in remaining free from multiple
state laws should be completely irrelevant in a determination of
whether Maine's law is constitutional.
Perhaps one of the reasons why Congress has not yet decided mul-
tiple state laws are unworkable is that maybe they are not.2" States
have traditionally been responsible for their citizens' health, and
some nationally operated private businesses in health-oriented fields
are subject to multiple regulatory schemes.69 Until Congress deter-
mines otherwise, no exception should be made for pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
drug industry is not operating in a free market now. Instead, the market is completely rigged, it
just happens to be in favor of the drug manufacturers. The industry asks consumers to rely only
on market tools, such as volume discounts, to combat the industry's non-market arsenal of pat-
ent protection laws, which allow it to charge consumers monopoly prices; government-funded
research whereby the industry can develop new drugs, largely at taxpayer expense to then sell to
consumers at monopoly prices; and tax breaks. See Goozner, supra note 258 (discussing the
regulatory phenomenon of patent protection for drug company discoveries that are largely the
result of government-funded research resulting in monopoly pricing to American consumers);
AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, supra note 261 (noting the pharmaceutical industry's decade of
success in Washington). If anything, some laws on the consumer side could help level the play-
ing field and make the pharmaceutical market resemble a free market more closely.
Indeed, as noted earlier, Congress is looking to the current patchwork of state laws in its
search for a national law. See GAO/HEHS-00-162, supra note 245 (reporting to Congress on the
states' pharmacy benefit programs).
267 See supra text accompanying notes 214 and 215 (discussing Regan's argument on this
point).
268 Even if a uniform national law would work better, the fact is that at this point, there is no
such uniform law. See supra Part IV.C. (discussing Congress' inability to pass prescription drug
legislation). It is not an answer to the senior citizens who cannot afford prescription drugs and
the state governments that are trying to assist them, to say that the only way to regulate the cost
of prescription drugs is with national legislation when none is forthcoming. Even if one were to
concede that state regulation is not the best way, right now it may be the only way.
26 A notable example is health insurance. For example, national health insurance compa-
nies are subject to state solvency laws. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 45, at 797. Another exam-
ple is medical malpractice, governed by state tort regimes. See id at 152 (noting that the medi-
cal profession's standards are enforced in tort suits).
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CONCLUSION: A LOOKAHEAD
This Comment has applied old arguments to a new issue to show
that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine should be re-evaluated.
This application reveals that current doctrine is too broad because it
would prevent states from enacting important health policy without
furthering any constitutional purpose. It also shows that the doctrine
is overbroad because it would prevent states from carrying out their
domestic duty simply because, in the process, they would impinge
upon the private interests of a powerful few. Finally, the current doc-
trine would unnecessarily subvert the states' political significance,
preventing them from effectively playing their role as policy innova-
tors.
Will the Act ultimately be upheld? That remains to be seen, but
in the end, the pharmaceutical industry may lose its real battle-the
battle to maintain the current favorable regulatory framework. 270 The
soaring cost of prescription drugs coupled with their ever-increasing
significance in American healthcare make it imperative that some-
thing be done to make prescription drugs more accessible. Add to
this the fact that the pharmaceutical industry enjoys the highest profit
margins of any industry in America 27' and you have a recipe for ac-
tion. Whether the action will be at the state or federal level remains
to be seen, but there are some factors that seem to favor the states.
One factor favoring the states is the Supreme Court. As a general
matter, the majority of the Court is considered conservative, and as
such is expected to favor more power for states. The Court's conser-
vatives have generally been true to form, showing a propensity to vote
in favor of states in recent cases.
With respect to the dormant Commerce Clause, there are mem-
bers of the Court who are openly opposed to it, namely Justices Scalia
and Thomas.7 In addition, Justice Rehnquist has consistently voted
270 See supra note 261 (discussing this regulatory framework).
2 See Goozner, supra note 258 (discussing the drug company's claim that it needs to charge
higQ prices to be able to invest in research).
See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. for the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 966 (2001) (holding
that suits for damages in federal court against states under the Americans With Disabilities Act
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (invalidating a federal statute enacted to abrogate state sover-
eign immunity against patent and trademark actions as beyond Congressional power). Of
course the Court could also go against the states because of a competing conservative cause,
which is the protection of private business, including the pharmaceutical industry. See, eg.,
Borger, supra note 260 (predicting that under Republican president George Bush, the U.S. will
return to its role of battering ram for pharmaceutical industry interests). The Court's conserva-
tives have shown a willingness to reverse their normal state-friendly stance when upholding state
laws would conflict with competing conservative agendas. See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 530
(2000) (holding that the Florida Supreme Court's order of voter recounts in the 2000 election
lacked the standards necessary to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause, thereby sealing a Republi-
can victory).
27 See Sara Sachse, Comment, United We Stand-But For How Long? Justice Scalia and the New
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to uphold state laws challenged for potential violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause."4 Sara Sachse opined that the dormant Com-
merce Clause's chief opponent, Justice Scalia, is gaining ground in
his desire to abandon the dormant Commerce Clause in the form of
exceptions to the rule .2 5 Given the important health policy implica-
tions of the Maine law, the Court may well find some sort of health
and welfare exception to the rule.
The other factor favoring the states is the current political climate.
Given the federal government's general failure to implement mean-
ingful healthcare reform, e~es have turned increasingly to the states
to help solve the problem.2 6 Some state health insurance programs
already implemented have been widely viewed as successful2, and
there is increasing acceptance of states as social policy engines, espe-
cially in the area of healthcare. In addition, the new presidential
administration has promised to shift power from the federal govern-
ment to the states on a host of domestic policy issues, one of which is
health and welfare.279
Based on these two factors, there is a good possibility that stateswill be granted the ability to exert more control over drug costs in the
near future, notwithstanding an effect on interstate commerce. We
will wait to see what form the state's control will take.
Developments of the Dormant Commerce Clause 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 695, 720 (1999).
274 See Drahozal, supra note 218, at 263-64 (noting that Rehnquist is a strong supporter of
states' rights and voted for upholding the statute in 79% of the cases studied).
275 See Sachse, supra note 273 at 720.
276 SeeSPARER, supra note 193, at 2-4 (discussing the failure of the Clinton national healthcare
proposal and the subsequent bipartisan turn to the states to solve the problem).
See, e.g., Pear, supra note 244 (quoting a health law professor as saying that Wisconsin's
expanded Medicaid program has been a "stunning success"); FURROW ET AL., supra note 45, at
880 (noting that Arizona's Medicaid managed care program has been given high marks).
27 See Pear, supra note 244 (noting recent state efforts to expand health insurance programs
though innovative techniques).
29 See id.
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